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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis discusses the importance of self-selection to understand how 
individuals behave and respond to incentives. Individuals self-select themselves 
into their preferred contracts in a number of ways. Labour contracts are a clear 
example where individuals choose a job according to its characteristics, whilst also 
aligning to their personal preferences and skills. The reasons why a worker chooses 
a job can predict how likely she or he will respond to different incentives, such as 
financial or social incentives. The economics wage efficiency theory predicts that 
a higher wage can both attract more productive workers and enhance performance. 
Laboratory experiments have constituently proven this theory, showing that when 
employers pay workers a ‘fair’ wage, workers reciprocate by working harder, as in 
a gift exchange fashion. Other studies have argued that social incentives can be 
equally effective at achieving the same goal: employers that donate a portion of 
their profits to charity, often known as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), can 
be attractive to workers and motivate them to work harder even at wages that are 
lower than competitor employers. More recently the gift exchange theory was 
challenged by field experiments that found little evidence of reciprocity.  
 
In the first chapter on this thesis, I argue that an important gap has not been 
addressed by the literature, namely, how sorting mechanisms can affect reciprocal 
behaviour. In lab experiments, employers and workers are often randomly and 
bilaterally matched in every round of a game. Whilst outside the controlled 
laboratory environment, workers choose the employer they want to work for and 
then decide how hard they are willing to work. To address this gap, I designed a 
modified version of the gift exchange game – the most commonly used game to 
study experimental labour markets – where two employers and one worker are 
randomly grouped together. In this experiment employers can use their initial 
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capital to make wage offers to workers and donate any percentage of their potential 
profits to charity (i.e. the level of CSR). In the control group workers are randomly 
matched to one of the two employers, as in other standard laboratory settings. In 
the treatment group, in every round workers can choose an employer from a set of 
two competitors, before determining their level of effort.  
 
The first key result I found is that workers always choose the employer offering 
the higher wage. Furthermore, workers choose the employers offering a higher level 
of CSR only when the wage offer is identical to that of a competitor. I also find that 
wages have a larger marginal effect than CSR at enhancing workers’ effort. The 
second contribution of this chapter is its reconciliation of the mixed evidence 
between field experiments and lab experiments. I find that the presence of 
competition among employers reduces the level of reciprocity from workers. I 
argue that workers already reciprocate higher wage offers by choosing an employer 
over a competitor, hence feeling less pressure to work harder once in the job. 
 
Based on findings from the first experiment, I returned to the lab to test the role 
of competition and self-selection in a modified version of the earlier gift exchange 
game, this time without the presence of CSR. The results of this second experiment 
are the topic of Chapter 2. I again find that the presence of competition reduces 
reciprocity, supporting findings from Chapter 1. Another contribution of this 
chapter is the study of how external wage offers affect workers’ behaviour. In the 
control condition of the experiment workers cannot select their preferred wage offer 
and are randomly matched to one of the two employers, but they can still see the 
offer of the unmatched employer. I find that this external wage offer influences 
workers’ behaviour as a reference point: after controlling for all other factors, when 
workers are randomly matched to the employer offering a higher wage they provide 
higher levels of effort. More striking and significant is the evidence of loss 
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aversion: subjects were more responsive to subjective losses than gains – that is, 
being paired to an employer who offered a lower wage was more ‘painful’ to the 
worker and led to a stronger (negative) reaction, than being paired to the higher 
offer employer, which led to a weaker (positive) reaction. In other words, workers 
penalised more employers that offered a lower wage than rewarding employers that 
offered a higher wage. Previous studies showed that reference points can influence 
workers’ effort. These include a target income they set for themselves or the amount 
other similar workers earn. In this experiment we show that another important 
reference point is the wage offered by another employer. If the current employer 
offers a wage that is above that of an external employer, workers will reciprocate 
by working harder, beyond the reciprocal response that would have occurred 
without the presence of the outside offer. If the wage offer is lower than that of a 
competitor, the worker will punish the employer with significantly lower effort.  
 
In the last section of the second chapter I compare results from the two 
experiments and show that in a competitive environment employers must compete 
more aggressively by offering higher wages to attract and motivate workers. 
Shifting resources away from wage offers to increase the level of CSR can lead to 
lower levels of reciprocal behaviour from workers and, consequently, reduce 
employers’ earnings. Employers interested in engaging in Corporate Social 
Responsibility initiatives as a Human Resources Management strategy to attract 
and motivate workers should consider how different types of workers will have 
varied responses to social incentives compared to more traditional financial 
incentives. Moreover, employers should understand the characteristics of the job 
that attracted their workforce in the first place so as to design incentives that reflect 
their preferences. 
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In the last chapter of this thesis I explore the role of self-selection in determining 
the effectiveness of defaults. Defaults proved to influence behaviour across a range 
of areas, from retirement savings to organ donations. Perhaps the main reason why 
defaults are effective is that individuals have a strong tendency to remain in their 
current situation rather changing to an alternative option. This is often referred to 
as ‘status quo bias’. Seeing as this bias strongly influences human behaviour, it is 
important to understand why and how individuals self-select into a situation or 
contract in the first place in order to design effective defaults. At the same time, a 
key challenge presented by defaults is that they can reduce an individuals’ sense of 
control, and be ineffective or counterproductive if they do not reflect the decision-
maker’s preferences and past behaviour.  
 
I study the role of defaults in a previously unexplored setting where a preference 
for control might be stronger than in other contexts: charitable giving. I analyse 
results of a field experiment ran by an NGO hosting an online peer-to-peer 
microlending platform. Lenders who had their loans fully repaid, but did not take 
any action for more than a year, received an email inviting them to use their money 
by a certain date in any way they preferred – withdraw, lend, donate or leave idle. 
In two treatment groups, lenders were told that if they did not take any action by 
the given date, their money was automatically going to be donated to the 
organisation (‘default donation’) or re-lent to a group of borrowers on their behalf 
(‘default loan’). Results show that both defaults were more effective at increasing 
the proportion of individuals giving to charity and the average amount given, 
compared to a simple ask. However, the default loan treatment was significantly 
more effective than the default donation. This suggests that to influence behaviour 
without risk of backfiring, defaults should be designed to consider individuals’ past 
behaviour and self-selection. Government agencies, not-for-profit, and private 
sector organisations interested in implementing defaults should first aim to 
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understand why and how individuals find themselves in a specific situation or 
contract in the first place. Defaults that reflect a decision-maker’s preferences have 
a higher chance of achieving their intended objectives. Preferences can often be 
elicited by observing past behaviour. Furthermore, it is important to understand that 
choices made in the past can influence behaviour as reference points.  Testing and 
evaluating different types of defaults can help improve their effectiveness and avoid 
counterproductive consequences. 
 
The three chapters in this thesis can be considered as individual standalone 
papers. The reader can review each chapter separately without loss of context. Each 
chapter includes an introduction, a literature review and hypotheses, and a 
discussion of the results from the experiments. Recommendations for future 
research and policy are discussed in the conclusions of each chapter. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Self-selection and Motivation: 
The Effectiveness of Financial and Social Incentives in a Gift 
Exchange Game with Sorting 
In this paper we study the role of social incentives, such as donating a portion of 
a company’s profit to charity (often known as Corporate Social Responsibility – 
CSR) to attract and motivate workers, and their interaction with more traditional 
financial incentives (i.e. higher wages). We implement a varied form of the gift-
exchange game where employers can make wage offers to workers and donate any 
percentage of their potential profits to charity. In our treatment group we introduce 
a sorting mechanism to allow workers to choose, in every round, the employer they 
prefer from a set of two competitors. Results show that workers always choose the 
higher wage offer, driving up wages faster in competition. CSR levels instead 
remain almost identical over time, on average between 10%-20% of an employer’s 
profit. Workers choose employers with higher CSR only when wage offers are 
identical. We find that workers are more responsive to higher wages than higher 
CSR, suggesting that higher wages remain the most effective mechanism to attract 
and motivate workers. Employers can use CSR as a social signal to attract workers 
only when wage offers are identical with their competitors, but can expect this to 
have more limited impact on inducing workers’ effort. This is in contrast with 
previous studies showing that social incentives can motivate workers to work 
harder at lower wages. Lastly, we find that the presence of competition reduces 
reciprocity from workers, possibly because workers already reciprocate a higher 
wage offer by choosing the employer over a competitor. This finding can help 
reconcile evidence from lab and field experiments examining gift exchange. 
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Labour contracts are incomplete by nature. The relationship between an employer 
and a worker is often regulated by contractual agreements, but effort is often hard 
to measure and enforce, and it may be induced by a number of factors outside mere 
contract clauses. Insights from behavioural economics – the growing literature at 
the intersection between psychology and economics – can help provide a better 
explanation about what motivates workers.  
The starting point of the behavioural economics literature on labour markets is 
Akerlof’s (1982) theory of partial gift exchange, according to which workers will 
work harder when they are paid what they will perceive is a ‘fair wage’ (as a form 
of quid pro quo gift-exchange). As a consequence, employers will want to keep 
offering wages that are higher than market-clearing levels to induce higher effort 
from workers and increase marginal productivity1. The theory has been supported 
empirically by the lab experiment ‘gift-exchange game’ designed by Fehr et al. 
(1993) and the many subsequent studies that replicated it with different variations.  
More recent studies suggest that workers might not respond only to higher wages, 
but also social incentives – such as donating a portion of an employer’s profit to 
charity, often known as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Koppel and Regner 
(2014) and Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2015) show, for instance, that informing 
workers that a portion of the employer’s profits generated from their work (or a 
portion of their own earnings) will be donated to a charity of their choice leads to 
higher levels of effort. Other studies even claim that companies that shift from 
profit maximisation strategies to focusing on achieving social goals can be 
successful at attracting productive workers, even at wages that are lower than 
competitors in the same sector (Bachaus et al. 2002; Montgomery et al., 2003). 
 
1
 Akerlof (1982), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Akerlof and Yellen (1990) suggested that under this setting, equilibrium 
unemployment results as a number of (unemployed) workers will be willing to work for lower wages, but firms will have no 
incentives to lower wages as they can get higher productivity by paying existing workers slightly more. 
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In this study we contribute to this growing literature by adding an important 
element of real-life scenarios that is often omitted in laboratory gift-exchange 
experiments, which is that workers first choose the employer they want to work for 
and then choose how hard they want to work. Because workers sort themselves into 
their preferred labour contracts and jobs, they might be more or less responsive to 
different types of incentives (e.g. financial versus social), depending on the 
motivation that led them to choose an employer or job position over another in the 
first place. To explain how self-selection can affect the impact of incentives, one 
can think of an hypothetical pair of workers, say an investment banker and a social 
worker: both will choose their jobs based on some specific features (e.g. attractive 
bonus versus high social impact) which they will expect to be reflected in the 
incentives that their employers will offer after they started in the job. As such, social 
incentives might work on some cohorts of workers but not all, depending on why 
they sorted themselves into a job. Not taking this important factor into account can 
lead to overestimation of the impact of non-traditional type of incentives. 
To study the role of self-selection and different types of incentives on worker’s 
motivation, we implement a modified gift exchange game, where employers can 
use their starting capital to make a wage offer to a worker and allocate any preferred 
portion of potential profits to charity. On every round, the worker can choose an 
offer between two employers randomly and anonymously grouped with her, and 
self-select herself into a preferred contract2. Our results show that CSR is less 
effective than wages to attract and motivate workers. We find, however, that under 
equal wages, higher CSR offers increase the chances of an employer being chosen 
against a competitor, which is in line with other studies showing that altruism can 
work as a social signal to increase partner attractiveness. We also find that the 
 
2
 To explore our research question in a field experiment, we would need to modify wages and CSR and observe effort, 
which might also lead to some workers wanting to change employer. As these manipulations are clearly infeasible in a field 
experiment, the gift exchange game laboratory experiment provides the most suitable alternative to test our hypotheses. 
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presence of employer competition reduces the level of effort provided by the 
worker, suggesting that workers might feel they have already reciprocated a higher 
wage offer by choosing the employer over another, hence feeling less pressure or 
need to reciprocate again by working harder. The remainder of the paper is as 
follows: in the next section we review the relevant experimental literature on gift 
exchange game and sorting mechanisms, with a brief overview of the more limited 
economics literature on CSR. We then describe the experimental design and the 
observed behaviour between treatments. In the last sections we present and discuss 
our results. Based on the results of this experiment, we returned to the lab to test 
the role of competition alone on wages, removing potential noise from the 
introduction of CSR. The details and results of this experiment are the topic of the 
second chapter of this thesis. 
 
I. Related Literature 
A. Reciprocity and Gift Exchange Games 
Reciprocity can be defined as a mutual exchange of favours between two parties 
that is not necessarily regulated or enforced by stipulated agreements. In the context 
of labour markets this term is often used to define the cooperative behaviour 
between an employer and a worker that is not captured by legal contracts. Akerlof 
(1982) hypothesised that employees who are paid more than the minimum wage for 
their job will provide higher levels of effort, even when this reciprocal behaviour 
is not bound by contractual clauses. This is in sharp contrast with the standard 
models of classical economics where the rational self-interested worker would be 
expected to provide the same level of effort stipulated in the contract whilst 
receiving a higher wage. 
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Fehr et al. (1993) designed a laboratory experiment, known as the ‘gift exchange 
game’, to seek empirical evidence of this hypothesis. In a typical gift exchange 
game setting, players are assigned the role of employer or worker and are randomly 
and anonymously paired together. In every round, the employer is given an initial 
capital that she can allocate between making a wage offer to the paired worker, and 
keeping to herself. The worker sees the wage offer and chooses a preferred level of 
effort with its associated costs, deducted from the accepted wage. Results from a 
large number of studies that replicated this experiment with numerous variations 
consistently find that workers “deviate away from self-interested-based prediction” 
(Fehr et al. 1998), or what is defined as a Nash equilibrium, and provide levels of 
effort that are higher than they would otherwise be expected to provide. 
Some of the many variations of this experiment showed that workers may be 
responsive also to non-monetary rewards, suggesting that signaling reciprocity 
might be as important as the value of the incentive per se (Kube et al. 2012). Other 
experiments also showed how workers’ likelihood to reciprocate can depend on 
their work experience (Hanna et al. 2002), the size of the workforce (Maximiano et 
al. 2007), the perceived level of wealth of the employer (Kessler, 2013) or the 
wages of the co-workers (Abeler et al., 2010). Charness (2012) also suggested that 
workers will work harder when they are given the opportunity to set their own 
wages, as a sign of trust and self-imposed accountability. 
Consistent with lab findings, some field experiments confirmed the presence of 
gift-exchange (Falk, 2007). Other field experiments, instead, found that reciprocity 
can vanish over longer periods of time and that this might not be captured by 
standard lab settings (Gneezy and List, 2006), leading some researchers to question 
the external validity of laboratory experiments (Levitt and List, 2007). Some 
authors tried to reconcile these findings, suggesting that both in the lab and in the 
field, experiments introduce some form of manipulations that can affect the results 
of the study (Falk and Heckman, 2009). In this paper we suggest two more possible 
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explanations that can help reconcile these mixed findings. The first one is that the 
way subjects are recruited in the experiment matters: individuals sort themselves 
into their preferred contracts depending on the wage offers and the nature of the 
work they can expect to perform. The second is that in the standard gift-exchange 
game a worker is usually paired bilaterally with the employer, hence the evaluation 
of what can be considered as a ‘fair wage’ is not based on what the worker could 
earn with another employer, as instead is the case in naturally occurring settings 
outside of the lab, where workers are able to make comparisons of what they 
perceive is a ‘fair wage’ against some ‘reference wage’. The importance of 
reference points to reconcile some of the lab and field evidence on reciprocity is 
explored more in detail in the second chapter of this thesis. In this chapter we show 
how the selection of the employer can be considered as an act of reciprocity in 
itself, leading workers to reduce effort. 
B. Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Over the past few decades, private sector companies around the world started to 
get more involved in not-for-profit activities, often supporting charitable causes. 
Perhaps the most common way companies engage in these initiatives is by donating 
a portion of their profits to charity, often referred to as ‘Corporate Philanthropy’ or 
‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (herein CSR) (see Chang, 2008 for a brief review 
of the management and marketing literature on the topic)3. 
It is yet unclear whether these initiatives are effective at achieving their intended 
social goals, but studies found that they can often be effective marketing strategies. 
For example, informing customers that a percentage of profits from the sales of a 
product will be donated to charity can significantly increase purchases (Luo, and 
 
3
 CSR can also take other forms, such as partnering of product with a cause, referred to as cause-related marketing (Chang, 
2008) or asking employees to take part in volunteering activities or pro-bono work for a charity, among others. 
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Bhattacharya, 2009; Strahilevitz and Myers, 1998; Strahilevitz, 1999). Other 
studies suggested that CSR initiatives can also operate as a useful human resource 
management tool to attract and motivate workers, with some even suggesting that 
CSR can be a suitable substitute for higher wages (Jones, 2014; Brekke and Nyborg, 
2007; Francois, 2003). Recent surveys among University graduates show that job 
applicants often expect their potential future employers to be ‘good corporate 
citizens’ and engage in some form of CSR, even if this would mean to forgo part 
of their salaries in order to work in a company with a social purpose (Australian 
Financial Review, 2016)4. In this study we want to test whether these survey-based 
and self-reported preferences are supported by empirical experimental evidence. 
Specifically, we want to study under what circumstances social incentives (e.g. 
CSR) can be substitutes or complements for attracting and motivating workers to 
work harder and to what extent these incentives are effective across all types of 
individuals, rather than a selected cohort. 
Our study also allows us to partially address one common criticism to lab 
experiments, which is that subjects taking part in these studies are often University 
students making hypothetical choices, making it hard to generalise findings to the 
broader population. In our case, instead, this cohort represents the ideal subject 
pool. Recent graduates who are about to apply for their first job are the human 
capital that companies and organisations compete to attract and retain. Whilst 
choosing a job in real life and taking part in a lab experiment have obviously 
different implications, the choices participants make in our experiment can perhaps 
be more relevant to them. Studying the role of self-selection and the right mix of 
incentives on this cohort of the population also makes our findings more relevant.  
 
4
 http://www.afr.com/leadership/company-culture/deloitte-report-finds-millennials-and-employers-in-conflict-over-
values-20160208-gmp2ju?&utm_source=social&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=nc&eid=socialn:twi-14omn0055-
optim-nnn:nonpaid-27062014-social_traffic-all-organicpost-nnn-afr-
o&campaign_code=nocode&promote_channel=social_twitter  
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C. Sorting in Experiments with Social Preferences 
The introduction of sorting mechanisms in lab and field experiments with social 
preferences is a relatively recent addition to the experimental economics literature. 
The argument for allowing subjects to choose their partners in experiments is that 
outside of the lab individuals choose to place themselves in situations where they 
have the opportunity to behave more or less altruistically or pro-socially5. 
Individuals who instead have lower preferences or regards for others, might tend to 
avoid such situations in the first place. Lazear et al. (2012) show that in a dictator 
game (another common laboratory experiment used to measure social preferences), 
giving subjects the choice to participate or opt out, before allocating a preferred 
amount to share, affects the likelihood and magnitude of sharing. In an earlier 
complementary paper, Slonim and Garbarino (2008) show that the sharing 
behaviour in a dictator game is also dependent on characteristics of whom the 
subjects choose as their partners in the game (e.g. gender). In the context of 
experimental labour markets, Dohmen and Falk (2011) apply a sorting mechanism 
where workers can choose between a fixed and a variable payment scheme. The 
authors find that output is higher in the variable-payment scheme and is driven 
mostly by the most productive workers who self-select themselves into this 
payment option. This suggests that previous lab experiments might have 
overestimated some of their subjects’ tendency to cooperate or reciprocate by 
ignoring the importance of self-selection. 
In our gift-exchange game experiment we take into account these considerations 
by allowing workers in every round to choose (out of two randomly grouped 
employers) the employer they want to work for by looking at each employer’s wage 
offer and level of CSR (as a percentage of potential profits donated to charity). We 
 
5
 See Ashraft et al. (2014), and Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) for studies on the role of sorting and incentives in the 
field. 
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are interested to see whether allowing workers to self-select into their preferred 
contracts has implications on their level of effort and reciprocity, and whether CSR 
is more effective than wages to attract workers and induce higher effort at the same 
time. For the second chapter of this thesis we returned to the lab to test the impact 
of competition on selection and reciprocity alone, by removing any possible noise 
that may be due to the presence of CSR. The overall findings from both chapters 
show that employers are more likely to be selected when they offer higher wages 
than competitors. We find evidence of reciprocity even when labour supply is lower 
than demand, with workers providing positive levels of effort even when there is 
no risk of unemployment. However, competition decreases both the likelihood of a 
worker reciprocating and the level of effort being provided. 
 
II. Hypotheses 
The key features of our gift exchange game are the presence of a sorting 
mechanism and the addition of social incentives to the more standard financial 
incentives. We would expect that when labour supply is lower than demand, 
employers will offer higher wages not just to motivate workers to work harder but 
firstly to attract them in order to be selected over a competitor. Employers in our 
game have two incentives they can use to attract workers: wages and CSR. To the 
extent that workers are motivated by financial (i.e. wage offers) or social (i.e. CSR) 
incentives and altruism, and self-select themselves into their preferred contract, we 
expect both incentives to increase in size more in competition than in non-
competition. Therefore, our first hypotheses are as follows: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1. H1: The presence of competition among employers increases 
wage offers compared to a non-competition environment 
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HYPOTHESIS 2. H2: The presence of competition among employers increases 
the levels of CSR compared to a non-competition environment 
 
As a consequence of this employers’ behaviour in competition, we expect workers 
to reciprocate in a gift-exchange manner in two ways: firstly, by selecting the most 
attractive employment offer, which will be their preferred mix of financial and 
social incentives from one of the two competing employers, and secondly by 
providing effort. In the selection process, we would expect workers driven by 
financial incentives to choose higher wages and workers driven by a preference for 
charity to choose higher levels of CSR. How these two incentives influence 
employer selection when they are presented in the same setting is unclear, hence 
our hypothesis is that each type of incentive can be equally effective at attracting 
different types of workers:  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3. H3a: Higher wages will lead to increased likelihood of an 
employer being selected in competition 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3. H3b: Higher CSR will lead to increased likelihood of an 
employer being selected in competition  
 
As in other lab and field experiments, we are interested in examining the presence 
of gift exchange by observing both the likelihood of a worker to provide positive 
levels of effort and the actual level of effort being chosen as wages and CSR 
increase: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4. H4a: Workers are more likely to reciprocate and provide 
higher levels of effort as wages increase 
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HYPOTHESIS 4. H4b: Workers are more likely to reciprocate and provide 
higher levels of effort as CSR increases 
 
In our setting, where labour demand is higher than labour supply, it is possible 
that the process of selecting an employer over another is perceived by the worker 
as an act of reciprocity in itself. Thus in competition the observed level of effort 
provided by the worker can be lower, since the worker will feel she has already 
reciprocated the employer with her choice. This would suggest that previous gift-
exchange game lab experiments without the presence of a sorting mechanism might 
have overestimated the presence and magnitude of reciprocity. At the same time, 
however, it is possible that when a worker actively chooses her employer in the 
game, she would feel more prone to reciprocate, in part to confirm her decision. 
Thus the impact of a sorting mechanism on reciprocal behaviour is unclear and it 
is worth the inclusion in the hypotheses we are interested in testing in this 
experiment: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 5. H5: The effects of wages and CSR on workers’ effort will be 
weaker in competition since workers will have already partially reciprocated 
employers by choosing them over a competitor 
 
III. Experiment 
A. Design and Procedure 
Our experiment is a modified version of the original gift-exchange game by Fehr 
et al. (1993). In the first stage of the game, all employers in the room decide 
independently how much of their initial endowment E of 120 Experimental 
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Currency Units (ECU) they want to allocate to make a wage offer w to the worker 
and what percentage of potential profits they want to donate to charity, which we 
will refer to in this paper as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).  
In the second stage of the game, the worker sees the wage offer and CSR chosen 
by two employers randomly grouped with her and chooses a level of work effort to 
provide. In one condition, workers are randomly matched to one of the two 
employers, as in the traditional set-up of gift-exchange games and other similar 
experiments using bilateral matching. We call this condition ‘non-competition’ 
(NC). In the other treatment, workers can choose which of the two employers they 
want to work for. We call this condition ‘competition’ (C). The employer that is 
not randomly matched to or chosen by the worker earns nothing in that round. 
At the beginning of each session a hard copy of the instructions is made available 
to each player and is read aloud by the experimenter, in an attempt to make all 
options and payoffs of employer, worker and charity common knowledge to all 
players6. Participants can also refer to the instructions and the payoffs formulae 
throughout the session. A summary of the payoffs formulae is shown in Table 1. 
Further, in every round workers are allowed to choose different employers (in the 
competition condition) and levels of effort and see what the outcome of that choice 
would be before confirming it and moving to the next round. 
 
TABLE 1. Payoffs of players 
 
 
 
 
6
 A copy of the instructions is provided in a separate Appendix. 
Payoff Employer πp = (100% - CSR) · (E – w) · e 
Payoff Worker πa = w – c(e) 
Payoff Charity πc = CSR · (E – w) · e 
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To avoid heterogeneity in knowledge and experience with the charity, we chose 
a not well-known national charity7.  Subjects were given a one page description 
about the mission of the charity and were also told that donations were made by the 
experimenters on behalf of all participants as a sum of all donations raised during 
the session, hence reducing possible social signaling and warm glow from giving 
(Andreoni, 1990; Benabou and Tirole, 2006). However, the amount of money 
received by the charity, as shown in Table 1, is affected by the decisions of both 
the employer and the worker. Exerting effort has a non-linear cost c(e) for workers 
which is deducted from the wage offer of the randomly matched or chosen 
employer, according to Table 2. The effort chosen by the worker affects both 
employer and charity payoffs according to the functions in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2. Cost of effort 
Effort level e 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
Cost of effort c(e) 
ECU 
0 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
 
After answering a series of comprehension questions to make sure all participants 
understood the instructions correctly8, players are randomly allocated to be either 
employer or worker and stay in the allocated role for the duration of the experiment 
– that is, 10 rounds. We implement a stranger design to avoid reputation effects: at 
 
7
 The chosen charity was the Australian ‘Cure Brain Cancer Foundation’. Across all sessions, 85% of subjects reported 
not having heard of the charity before and 94% never made a donation to the charity before the experiment. 
8
 Participants answered on average 87% of questions correctly. A survey at the end of the experiment shows that 97% of 
participants found the instructions easy to understand and 96% thought the options available to them in the experiment were 
easy to understand. 
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the beginning of each of the ten rounds, all players are reminded that in the 
following round they will be randomly regrouped with two different players.  
Participants in each session were further divided into matching groups, consisting 
of half of the employers and half of the workers in the room on each session. For 
example, if a session had 18 subjects in total, participants were randomly split into 
two groups consisting of 6 employers and 3 workers each that would interact with 
each other for the whole game. Participants were not told of the matching groups, 
nor which subjects belonged to which group, and did not know what role was 
played by any other subject in the room. After the last round, subjects answered a 
short questionnaire about themselves and their experience in the experiment.  
Each session lasted approximately 60 minutes. Points earned in ECU were then 
converted to Australian dollars at an exchange rate of 0.05AUD/ECU and 
participants were paid in cash for all rounds depending on the outcome of their 
choices plus an additional AUD$5 show-up fee. The experiment was conducted at 
the Behavioural Computer Lab of the University of Sydney, Australia, between 
April and May 2016, for a total of eight sessions with 108 participants. In each of 
the two conditions, there were three sessions with n = 12 participants and one 
session with n=18 participants. A summary of the demographic characteristics of 
participants across the two conditions is provided in the Appendix. Participants 
were not statistically different between the two conditions on any observable 
characteristic. The experiment was conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and 
participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). On average subjects 
earned AUD$ 17. 
 
B. Results 
 
In this section we present the results of the experiment and discuss possible 
explanations for the observed behaviour, both at the individual and group level (i.e. 
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a triad of two employers and one worker in each round). We first analyze 
employers’ behaviour between the competition (C) and non-competition (NC) 
treatments. Table 3 summarizes the key variables being discussed in this section. 
On average, wage offers of both employers and paired employer were higher in the 
competition condition than in non-competition, whilst CSR was higher in the non-
competitive scenario but approximately the same between paired9 and unpaired 
employer in the competition setting. 
 
TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics of Wage and CSR variables 
ECU Competition Non-competition 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Average wage offer (both employers) 180 65.52 15.70 50.49 16.56 
Average CSR (both employers) 180 13.46 12.41 15.72 14.83 
Wage offer paired employer 180 73.12 16.14 51.50 22.66 
Wage offer unpaired employer 180 57.87 19.79 49.60 24.77 
CSR paired employer 180 13.92 16.34 16.72 22.77 
CSR unpaired employer 180 13.04 19.05 14.73 20.59 
 
 
A closer look at earnings by group level suggests that the charity was better off 
in the non-competitive scenario, whilst workers earned significantly more in the 
competitive setting, and employers earned similar amounts in both conditions (a 
similar table breaking down earnings by experimental session is provided in the 
Appendix, showing similar results). 
 
9
 We use the term ‘paired employer’ to refer to employers that were either randomly matched to the worker in the NC 
setting and the employer chose by the worker in the C setting. 
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TABLE 4. Descriptive Statistics by Groups10 
ECU Competition Non-competition 
Group 
Average 
Employers 
Earnings 
Average 
Workers 
Earnings 
Average 
Charity 
Earnings 
Average 
Employers 
Earnings 
Average 
Workers 
Earnings 
Average 
Charity 
Earnings 
1 8.70 54.85 2.45 8.10 43.25 16.20 
2 6.33 67.35 0.95 4.63 47.70 9.25 
3 2.87 70.47 5.73 4.13 48.93 8.27 
4 2.00 72.65 4.00 2.38 52.40 4.75 
5 1.80 63.20 2.15 1.40 38.50 2.80 
6 1.53 82.15 3.05 1.30 51.35 2.60 
7 0.87         71.60 1.73 0.67 45.97 1.33 
8 0.55 66.20 1.10 0.05 48.85 0.10 
Average 2.99 68.56 2.65 2.83 47.12 5.66 
 
 
Wage Settings and Social Incentives. – Figure 1 shows the average wage offer of 
both employers over ten rounds between the two conditions. On average, employers 
in both conditions offered mostly wages that were above the minimum amount (i.e. 
20 ECU). Wage offers started higher in the competitive treatment, with average 
wage across the two employers in round 1 being 51.6 in competition (C), against 
an average of 41.8 in non-competition (NC), with this difference being statistically 
significant (p < 0.001 Wilcoxon rank-sum test, with subject as unit of observation). 
The average wage offer increased in both conditions over the first four rounds, 
remaining higher in the C than NC condition after that. While the wage offers 
continued to increase in competition, they fell slightly during the final 6 rounds in 
 
10
 Groups are listed in order of employers’ earnings, from highest to lowest in competition and non-competition 
respectively 
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the non-competitive condition.  In the competitive condition, wages increased from 
an average of less than half of an employer’s endowment to almost two thirds. 
Average wage offer across employers in the competition treatment increased to 
almost 50% more than in the non-competition treatment by the end of the ten rounds 
(p < 0.01, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, with group as unit of observation)11. Error bars 
refer to standard error around the mean for each period. 
 
FIGURE 1. Average wage offer of both employers per period 
 
Similarly, we plot average CSR in both conditions over ten rounds. Here a value 
of 10 on the y-axis corresponds to 10% of profits being donated to charity by the 
employer, a value of 15 is equal to 15% of profits donated to charity and so on. 
Figure 2 shows that CSR starts lower and increases over time in the competition 
 
11
 Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows that the probability that the average wage in the competition treatment is 
higher than the average wage in the non-competition treatment over all rounds is 75.2% (p < 0.01).   
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condition, but it remained almost constant in the non-competitive condition. Whilst 
employers can choose to donate to charity any percentage of profits they want, from 
0% to 100%, on average most employers chose to donate more than 0% but they 
rarely exceeded 20% of potential profits12. 
The test that CSR is higher in the competition treatment than in the non-
competition treatment is not significant neither in the first round (p = 0.109, 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, with subjects as unit of observation) nor over all rounds 
(p = 0.172, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, with group as unit of observation). 
   
FIGURE 2. Average CSR offer of both employers per period 
 
As in other standard gift exchange games where one employer and one worker 
are paired bilaterally, we look at the specific relationship between worker and the 
 
12
 Employers chose to donate more than 20% of their potential profits to charity 14% and 23% of times in competition 
and non-competition conditions respectively. 
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paired employer (i.e. the employer chosen by the worker in the competition 
treatment and the randomly matched employer in the non-competition treatment). 
Figure 3 plots the average wage offer of the paired employer only. It can be seen 
that the differences between the two conditions – competition and non-competition 
– are remarkable. In the competitive condition, employers start with an already 
higher average wage, which increases steadily over time, whilst in non-competitive 
environment it starts lower and remains more constant over time. Overall, the 
average wage offer of the paired employer is significantly higher in competition 
than in non-competition (Mann-Whitney test: p < 0.05, and Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test: p < 0.05, group as unit of observation). The average difference across the ten 
rounds is 21.6 ECU, from a minimum of 15.3 in round 2 to a maximum of 29 ECU 
in round 8. 
 
FIGURE 3. Average wage offer of paired employer per period 
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The same analysis is presented for the CSR in Figure 4. Here the differences 
between the two conditions are less visible across rounds and are not significant (p 
= 0.59, Mann-Whitney test, with group as unit of observation). 
 
FIGURE 4. Average CSR of paired employer per period 
 
Financial and Social Incentives in a Competitive Environment – We now 
examine whether the increase in wages (but not CSR) over time in the competitive 
but not in the non-competitive condition can be explained by the workers’ ability 
to select their employer.  Over all rounds, when the two employers chose different 
wages (n=158), employees selected the employer who offered the higher wage 87% 
of the time.  Figure 5 shows that average wage of the chosen employer was 
consistently above the wage of the not chosen employer, both increasing over time, 
consistent with the hypothesis that employers competed on higher wages to attract 
workers. 
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FIGURE 5. Average wage offer of chosen and not chosen employer in the competition 
treatment 
 
CSR levels differed between employers in the competitive condition 78% of the 
time (142 out of 180), with the employer offering a higher CSR being chosen 60% 
of times. In the competitive setting, employers chose the same wage offer 22 times 
out of 180 (12% of times). Of these 22 times when wage offers were identical, 6 
times CSR levels were identical. Of the remaining 16 times when wage offers were 
identical and the CSR offer differed, workers chose the employer that donated more 
to charity 15 times; i.e. 94% of the time when employers offered the same wage but 
different CSRs, a worker chose the employer with the higher CSR.  
Overall, this evidence suggests that employers competed more aggressively on 
wages, with CSR being critical to break ties in wage offers. Given wage offers were 
not commonly identical, and thus CSR played only a small role in determining the 
employer chosen, it is not surprising that the difference across CSR levels between 
chosen and not chosen employers is not large, as shown in Figure 6.  
30 
 
 
FIGURE 6. Average CSR of chosen and not chosen employer in the competition 
treatment 
 
To estimate whether these effects are statically significant, we run a series of 
regressions, starting with the following model to study the effect of wages and CSR 
on the probability of an employer being chosen:  
 
(1) Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1) =  𝛽1 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖 +  
+ 𝛽3 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 ∗  𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖 ∗  𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖 
 
The dependent variable is a binary dummy that assigns a value of 1 or 0, with 1 
if the employer was selected. The independent variables are also a series of binaries 
with values of 1 when the selected employer offered a higher wage or a higher CSR 
than a competitor (𝛽1 and 𝛽2 respectively), or the same wage and CSR and vice 
versa, covering all possible combinations. We cluster standard errors at the 
matching group level since subjects interacted throughout the experiment with the 
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same subjects within their matching group. The estimates from the Probit 
regression in Table 5 indicate that both higher wages and higher CSR increased the 
probability of an employer being chosen in a competitive environment, with wages 
having a significantly larger effect. Similarly, offering a higher CSR when wage 
offers were identical increased the probability of an employer being selected. 
 
TABLE 5. Determinants of Employer Choice in Competition  
(1) to (4) Probit models; Robust standard errors clustered around matching groups. 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-2.091*** 
(0.475) 
-2.122*** 
(0.502) 
-1.362** 
(0.599) 
-1.373** 
(0.637) 
Higher Wage 
2.605*** 
(0.317) 
2.395*** 
(0.367) 
2.301*** 
(0.392) 
2.168*** 
(0.444) 
Higher CSR 
1.353*** 
(0.102) 
1.366*** 
(0.0791) 
  
Higher Wage * Same 
CSR 
 
0.894 
(0.589) 
 
0.678 
(0.519) 
Higher CSR * Same 
Wage 
  
6.792*** 
(0.604) 
6.873*** 
(0.612) 
Pseudo - R2 0.4564 0.4696 0.4737 0.4811 
Cluster SEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Round dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 180 180 180 180 
𝛽1= 𝛽2 
Χ2= 33.88 
p < 0.0001 
Χ2= 12.75 
p < 0.0001 
  
𝛽1= 𝛽4   
Χ2= 274.74 
p < 0.0001 
Χ2= 30.81 
p < 0.0001 
32 
 
RESULT 1. Employer selection was driven by higher wages and higher CSR, 
with higher wages having a larger effect (H3a) 
 
RESULT 2. Under equal wage offers, higher CSR drove employer selection 
(H3b) 
 
This result is in line with other studies in the charitable giving context that suggest 
that altruism can operate as a social signal. A recent paper by Fehrler and 
Przepiorka (2013) for instance shows that altruism can increase the chances of 
being selected as a partner in other common laboratory games. 
 
Wage Determination – We are now interested in understanding how wages get 
determined and change over time across conditions. To achieve this goal we run a 
linear regression on the average wage offer of both employers against a dummy for 
competition, round dummies and interaction terms of round and competition 
dummies, clustering at the matching group level. 
 
TABLE 6. Effect of Competition on Wage and CSR Determination 
 Average Wage Average CSR 
 (1) (2) 
Constant 41.81* 
(3.568) 
14.94* 
(2.341) 
Competition 9.861* 
(0.999) 
-2.583** 
(0.200) 
Round 2 1.306 
(5.223) 
-2.222 
(0.571) 
Round 3 9.472* 1.917 
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(1.399) (2.712) 
Round 4 14.53 
(7.621) 
-0.417 
(1.399) 
Round 5 13.25 
(6.479) 
1.667 
(1.142) 
Round 6 13.36 
(9.448) 
0.333 
(1.770) 
Round 7 9.611 
(5.024) 
4.306*** 
(0.0285) 
Round 8 7.361 
(4.824) 
0.194 
(2.255) 
Round 9 10.86 
(5.623) 
0.583 
(4.253) 
Round 10 7.167 
(3.882) 
1.472 
(3.340) 
Round 2*Competition 3.583 
(8.763) 
3 
(1.313) 
Round 3*Competition 1.861 
(4.367) 
-1.722 
(2.569) 
Round 4*Competition -3.694 
(11.67) 
-1.889* 
(0.171) 
Round 5*Competition 3.167 
(2.455) 
-2.083 
(2.940) 
Round 6*Competition  1.611 
(4.967) 
-0.806 
(5.737) 
Round 7*Competition 6.278 
(3.539) 
-4.444 
(1.884) 
Round 8*Competition 12.11 
(3.539) 
2 
(9.819) 
Round 9*Competition 10.58 3.750 
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(1.855) (13.84) 
Round 10*Competition 16.19* 
(1.284) 
5.444 
(9.648) 
R2 0.289 0.031 
Cluster SEs Yes Yes 
Observations 360 360 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered around matching groups. 
We group all triads in one round to create one observation – that is, two employers and one 
worker randomly grouped together in one round, leading to n = 360. 
 
 
From Table 6 we can see that the presence of competition significantly increased 
the average wage offer over time (as shown by coefficients of the interaction terms 
of competition dummy with rounds, specially comparing the first 5 and second 5 
rounds), whilst CSR decreased, supporting the hypotheses that employers 
competed more aggressively on wage offers than CSR. Likewise, the goodness of 
fit of the regression on average wage does a better job at explaining the relationship 
with competition compared to average CSR.  
 
RESULT 3. The two conditions exhibit significant differences with respect to 
average wages: higher wages occurred in the competitive condition and they 
increased significantly over time, but not in the non-competitive condition (H1).  
 
RESULT 4. There is not a significant difference on average CSR with respect to 
the conditions and they exhibit similar steady patterns over time (H2). 
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To test if competition for being chosen drives higher wages over time, we introduce 
an interaction term of lagged higher wage offered by a competitor in the previous 
round13. 
TABLE 7. Wage and CSR Determination14 
 Wage Offer Employer 1 CSR Offer Employer 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 56.44* 
(7.642) 
53.65* 
(5.446) 
14.22 
(5.687) 
15.42 
(7.170) 
Competition -2.950 
(10.88) 
-1.636 
(7.485) 
-4.760 
(6.287) 
-5.420* 
(0.822) 
Wage offer of Employer 2 on 
previous round 
-0.0973 
(0.0835) 
-0.107 
(0.0855) 
  
Wage offer of Employer 2 on 
previous round * Competition 
0.335 
(0.0917) 
0.333 
(0.0715) 
  
CSR offer Employer 2 on previous 
round 
  0.0924 
(0.0414) 
0.0898 
(0.0351) 
CSR offer Employer 2 on previous 
round * Competition 
  -0.103 
(0.0508) 
-0.106 
(0.0598) 
Round 2 -11.93*** 
(0.140) 
-9.291* 
(0.927) 
0.764 
(1.103) 
-1.326 
(3.871) 
Round 3 -4.317 
(0.943) 
-2.780 
(4.499) 
2.821* 
(0.323) 
1.434 
(3.604) 
Round 4 0.482 
(1.405) 
9.233 
(11.87) 
0.518* 
(0.0668) 
-0.296 
(4.402) 
Round 5 1.737 
(4.620) 
5.366 
(4.187) 
5.332 
(2.603) 
6.513 
(2.441) 
Round 6 1.742 
(6.656) 
6.719 
(11.33) 
- - 
Round 7 -1.629 
(1.720) 
1.612 
(4.323) 
6.335 
(1.528) 
8.858 
(5.325) 
Round 8 0.901 
(0.448) 
2.900*** 
(0.000638) 
2.682 
(1.746) 
0.0285 
(0.265) 
Round 9 2.066 
(3.185) 
4.865 
(0.944) 
5.777 
(1.677) 
2.686 
(6.421) 
Round 10 - - 8.288 
(2.065) 
4.138 
(1.780) 
Round 2*Competition  -  2.548 
(3.125) 
 
13
 We use the denomination Employer 1 and 2 to simply distinguish between two different employers 
14
 Round 1 variables were treated as missing observations 
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Round 3*Competition  2.262 
(8.600) 
 1.142 
(0.779) 
Round 4*Competition  -12.04 
(18.53) 
 - 
Round 5*Competition  -1.796 
(3.394) 
 -4.010 
(1.541) 
Round 6*Competition   -4.428 
(6.581) 
 -1.649 
(8.602) 
Round 7*Competition  -0.995 
(2.598) 
 -6.665 
(1.148) 
Round 8*Competition  1.507 
(3.497) 
 3.671 
(12.70) 
Round 9*Competition  -0.122 
(7.225) 
 4.563 
(18.16) 
Round 10*Competition  5.550 
(2.743) 
 6.679 
(8.119) 
Cluster SEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 324 324 324 324 
R2 0.206 0.2161 0.034 0.042 
(1) to (4) OLS; Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on matching group). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Omitted variables for rounds are due to perfect collinearity 
 
 
The parameters from model (2) in Table 7 show that in competition the wage 
offered by the other employer in a previous round has a positive effect on increasing 
wage offered by the observed employer, but this effect was not significant (p = 
0.135. Similarly, in competition observing the CSR level chosen by the other 
employer has a negative effect on the level of CSR that the observed employer will 
choose in the subsequent round, although this was also not significant (p = 0.238).  
 
One explanation of these results can be that employers might have adapted their 
wage offers and CSR levels based on the expected response from workers, rather 
than based on what other employers were doing in the game. 
 
Gift Exchange and Reciprocity – We now analyse the behaviour of the workers. 
Figure 7 shows the average work effort, mostly positive in both competition and 
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non-competition conditions (higher than zero 93% and 87% of times in competition 
and non-competition respectively)15. Figure 7 suggests that there is no substantial 
difference between workers’ unconditional behaviour in competition and non-
competition, being positive in both cases. Nonetheless, employers may be able to 
induce higher levels of efforts from workers (and encourage selection in the 
competition condition) by varying their wage offer and CSR levels. 
 
 
FIGURE 7. Average work effort between conditions 
 
To understand how these two variables affect worker’s effort in both conditions, 
we plot effort against the wage offer and CSR of the paired employer (i.e. the 
chosen or randomly matched employer). To better visualise the relationship of these 
variables we also plot a line of fitted values with a 95% confidence interval. 
Because we are interested in studying reciprocity in terms of how a level of work 
effort chosen by the worker affects outcomes for the employer, we remove the few 
 
15
 In our setting workers can choose a value of 0 and still keep the full amount of money from the offered wage 
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observations when employers offered a wage of 120 ECU, since no matter what the 
level of effort the worker would choose, this would lead to no earnings for the 
employer. This led to 4 and 3 observations being dropped in non-competition and 
competition respectively.  
Figures 8 and 9 below show that the relationship between employers’ wage offer 
and CSR on workers’ effort is similar to previous gift exchange game experiments. 
In the competitive condition, however, when workers can choose the employer, we 
see what appears to be a somewhat weaker effect of wages and CSR on effort 
(Figures 10 and 11). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8. Work effort as a function of wage offer 
in non-competition condition 
 
FIGURE 9. Work effort as a function of CSR in 
non-competition condition 
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FIGURE 10. Work effort as a function of wage 
offer in competition condition  
 
FIGURE 11. Work effort as a function of CSR in 
competition condition 
 
To examine the presence of a gift exchange, we first look at the probability of a 
worker providing positive effort as wage offer and CSR of the paired employer 
increase. To achieve this goal, we create a dummy variable for gift exchange that 
gets a value of 1 when the level of chosen work effort is positive, and regress it 
against wage offer and CSR of the paired employer only16. Results from Table 8 
show that wage offer and CSR have a positive effect on increasing the probability 
that the worker will reciprocate and provide positive levels of effort. The presence 
of competition, however, has a negative effect on the probability of seeing gift 
exchange. This can be seen both by the competition dummy in model (1) and the 
interaction term with wage offer in model (2). Models (3) and (4) provide estimates 
on the marginal probability of each independent variable, showing that both wage 
and CSR are effective at increasing the probability of workers reciprocating, but 
 
16
 To regress positive work effort against wage offer and CSR of the paired employer, we group triads in one round to 
create one observation – that is, two employers and one worker randomly grouped together in one round. This reduces our 
observations to n = 360 in total, equally split between the two conditions. We then remove 7 observations where the paired 
employer offered a wage equal to 120 ECU as previously explained in the text. 
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wage offer has a substantially higher marginal probability compared to CSR. 
Similarly, the presence of competition negatively affects the probability of a worker 
reciprocating, as shown by the interaction term of wage offer and competition 
dummy in model (4).  
TABLE 8. Probability of Gift Exchange 
(1) and (2) Probit, (3) and (4) Marginal Probit (dprobit). *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust cluster standard errors 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Our second measure of gift-exchange is the slope of the effort in response to 
higher wages and higher CSR. Table 9 reports the results of a regression where 
effort is now a continuous variable, going from 0 to 1. 
 
 
 
 
Gift Exchange (binary 0 or 1) 
Paired Employer (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.241 
(0.879) 
-1.884*** 
(0.116) 
  
Competition dummy -0.300*** 
(0.0341) 
4.534*** 
(0.977) 
-0.0329 
(0.0218) 
0.600** 
(0.239) 
Wage 0.0245 
(0.0169) 
0.0742*** 
(0.00764) 
0.00268*** 
(0.000364) 
0.00384*** 
(0.00138) 
CSR 0.0341*** 
(0.0117) 
0.0317* 
(0.0188) 
0.00372*** 
(0.000781) 
0.00164*** 
(0.000550) 
Wage * Competition  -0.0933*** 
(0.0248) 
 -0.00483* 
(0.00253) 
CSR * Competition  0.00145 
(0.00383) 
 0.000075 
(0.000179) 
Observations 353 353 353 353 
Pseudo- R2 0.1835 0.3336 0.1835 0.3336 
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TABLE 9. Determinants of Gift Exchange 
Tobit with (1) 34 left-censored and 19 right censored obs.; (2) 34 left-censored obs.  Worker Dummies 
are dummy variables for each worker to account for different levels of reciprocity among subjects 
assigned to the role of worker. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust (cluster) standard errors in 
parenthesis  
 
 
Table 9 almost mirrors the results from Table 8, suggesting that wage offer and 
CSR have a positive effect not only at increasing the probability that the worker 
will reciprocate, but also by increasing the actual level of work effort provided by 
the worker. Again the interaction term with competition shows that when workers 
can choose their employer, they tend to reciprocate less and provide lower levels of 
effort. Further, the negative effect of competition on reciprocity is robust to the 
introduction of worker-specific characteristics by including worker dummies in the 
Tobit model (2). An F-test also shows that a wage offer plus the interaction term 
wage offer by competition is not statistically significant. This result might suggest 
that gift exchange can be observed mainly in a setting without competition, as in a 
Work Effort (continuous 0 to 1) 
Paired Employer (1) (2) 
Constant -0.267*** 
(0.00156) 
-0.244*** 
(0.0506) 
Competition dummy 0.334 
(0.273) 
0.533*** 
(0.0593) 
Wage 0.0103*** 
(0.00127) 
0.0100*** 
(0.00124) 
CSR 0.00562*** 
(0.00109) 
0.00413*** 
(0.000121) 
Wage * Competition -0.00704*** 
(0.00268) 
-0.00740*** 
(0.000663) 
CSR * Competition -0.00107 
(0.00154) 
-0.00362 
(0.00228) 
Worker dummy No Yes 
Observations 353 353 
Pseudo - R2 0.4103 0.5444 
Wage + Wage*Competition = 0 F( 1, 348) = 0.67 
p = 0.4138 
F( 1, 315) = 1.88 
p = 0.1716 
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standard laboratory setup. When a sorting mechanism is introduced, workers 
reciprocate less. This can be explained by the fact that workers might perceive they 
have already reciprocated the employer by choosing her over a competitor, hence 
feeling less the pressure or need to reciprocate again by providing higher levels of 
effort. Likewise, employers might increase wages in a competitive environment to 
attract workers first, rather to expect induced higher level of effort. This results can 
also help explain why there is some discrepancy between lab and field experiments 
observing gift exchange (see List, Gneezy, 2007 for example).   
 
RESULT 7 – As wage offer and CSR increase, workers increase effort but more 
in the non-competition conditions (as in other gift-exchange games) (H4a). 
 
RESULT 8 – Higher wages are marginally more effective than CSR at increasing 
both the likelihood of a worker reciprocating and the level of effort provided (H4b). 
 
RESULT 9 – The presence of employer competition negatively affects the 
likelihood of workers reciprocating the employer as well as the magnitude of the 
level of effort provided (H5) 
 
To visually see this, we first group wage offer of the paired employer by three 
groups: low (when wage offer is between 20 and 59 ECU); medium (60 to 99 ECU); 
and high (100 to 120 ECU). Plotting the average work effort across all workers we 
can see that, on average, in both conditions a low wage is met with a very low level 
of work effort (Figure 12). In the competitive environment, however, marginal 
increases in wage offers do not seem to lead to higher levels of effort. This suggests 
that that gift exchange is lower in a competitive environment. We plot the same 
relationship for CSR at three different levels (0-39%; 40-79%; and 80-100%) 
against average work effort (Figure 13). 
43 
 
FIGURE 12. Average work quantity as a function of low, medium and high wage offer 
of paired employer in both conditions 
 
 
FIGURE 13. Average work quantity as a function of low, medium and high CSR of paired 
employer in both conditions 
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The line graphs of Figures 12 and 13 seem to suggest that competition decreases 
the average level of work effort as wages and CSR increase. This difference is 
indicative of the direction of impact of sorting in otherwise identical experimental 
setting. Without the competition, average work effort is comparable to previous gift 
exchange game experiments, whilst competition decreases the average work effort 
from 0.47 to 0.28 (across all rounds). A very similar effect of competition on work 
effort is observed also for CSR, decreasing from an average of 0.5 in the non-
competition treatment to an average of 0.35 in the competition treatment. 
 
IV. Discussions and Conclusions 
In this study we implemented a modified gift-exchange game in the laboratory to 
test the impact of financial and social incentives to attract and motivate workers. In 
our game, employers can use their initial endowment to make a wage offer to the 
worker and choose a level of potential profits they want to donate to charity, as a 
form of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). To account for self-selection into 
preferred labour contracts, we ran a treatment condition with a sorting mechanism, 
where workers can choose between two employers in every round. 
   We find that employers that offer the higher wage are significantly more likely to 
be chosen by workers, and as a result wages increase dramatically in the 
competitive setting. Offering a higher CSR can get an employer to be selected over 
a competitor, but only when their wage offers are identical. Our results also show 
that higher wages have a significantly higher effect in inducing worker’s effort 
compared to CSR. This suggests that, in contrast with previous studies and surveys 
based on self-reported measures of job preferences, especially among graduates, 
social incentives can operate as a social signal of altruism to attract workers only 
when wage offers are identical to other competitors.  
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    In line with previous studies, we find evidence of reciprocity, but the introduction 
of a sorting mechanism decreases both the likelihood of a worker to provide 
positive levels of effort and the level of effort itself. This suggests that the gift 
exchange may be much weaker (or even non-existent) when there is an excess 
demand for worker’s labor supply than in past studies that have explored either 
excess supply or an equal labor supply and demand. To better study the impact of 
competition on wage offers and reciprocity, we returned to the lab with the same 
modified gift-exchange game, but this time without the presence of CSR. At the 
end of chapter 2 we discuss the findings of the four treatments taken all together. 
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Appendices 
A. Demographic Characteristics 
 Competition Non-competition 
Characteristic Mean % SD Mean % SD p-value 
Female 30 56% 0.50 30 56% 0.50 0.50 
Age 24 44% 4.37 25 46% 5.64 0.34 
Undergraduate 40 74% 0.44 35 65% 0.48 0.15 
Major Econ or Business 27 50% 0.50 22 41% 0.50 0.17 
Liked the Charity 20 37% 0.49 25 46% 0.50 0.05 
At least one donation in past year 43 80% 0.41 43 80% 0.41 0.50 
Low Generosity 15 28% 0.45 11 20% 0.41 0.19 
Medium Generosity 22 41% 0.50 21 39% 0.49 0.42 
High Generosity 5 9% 0.29 12 22% 0.42 0.03 
High Disposable Income 15 28% 0.45 10 19% 0.39 0.13 
p-values are calculated with a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, with subjects as unit of observation. 
B. Descriptive Statistics by Session 
ECU Competition Non-competition 
Group 
Average 
Employers 
Earnings 
Average 
Workers 
Earnings 
Average 
Charity 
Earnings 
Average 
Employers 
Earnings 
Average 
Workers 
Earnings 
Average 
Charity 
Earnings 
1 7.93 73.95 3 8.28 44.6 3.72 
2 6.94 69.2 2.07 10.16 47.25 4.37 
3 9.36 64.72 3.97 9.80 49.4 4.02 
4 8.44 65.82 2.57 10.76 49.25 7.77 
5 5.25 76.1 1.1 17.6 38 13.4 
6 10.71 68.1 2.2 16.25 48.8 7.2 
Average 8.15 68.83 2.76 10.55 47.15 5.56 
 
47 
 
REFERENCES  
Abeler, J., Altmann, S., Kube, S., & Wibral, M. (2010). Gift Exchange and 
Workers’ Fairness Concerns: When Equality is Unfair. Journal of the European 
Economic Association. Vol 8(6), 1299-1324. 
Akerlof, G. A. (1982). Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 97, No. 4, pp. 543-569 
Akerlof, G. A. & Yellen, J. L. (1985). The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and 
Unemployment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 105, No. 2, pp. 255-
283 
Ashraf, N., Bandiera, O., & Jack, B. K. (2014). No margin, no mission? A field 
experiment on incentives for public service delivery. Journal of Public 
Economics, 120, 1-17. 
Backhaus, K.B., Stone, B.A., & Heiner, K. (2002). Exploring the Relationship 
between Corporate Social Performance and Employer Attractiveness. Business 
Society. Vol. 41 No. 3, 292-318 
Brekke, K. A., & Nyborg, K. (2008). Attracting responsible employees: Green 
production as labor market screening. Resource and Energy Economics, 30(4), 
509-526. 
Chang, C. T. (2008). To donate or not to donate? Product characteristics and 
framing effects of cause‐related marketing on consumer purchase behavior. 
Psychology & Marketing, 25(12), 1089-1110. 
Charness, G., Cobo-Reyes, R., Jiménez, N., Lacomba, J. A., & Lagos, F. (2012). 
The hidden advantage of delegation: Pareto improvements in a gift exchange 
game. The American Economic Review, 102(5), 2358-2379. 
Dohmen, T., & Falk, A. (2011). Performance pay and multidimensional sorting: 
Productivity, preferences, and gender. The American Economic Review, 101(2), 
556-590. 
48 
 
Falk, A. (2007). Gift exchange in the field. Econometrica, 75(5), 1501-1511. 
Falk, A., & Heckman, J. J. (2009). Lab experiments are a major source of 
knowledge in the social sciences. Science, 326(5952), 535-538. 
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G. and Riedl, A. (1993). Does Fairness Prevent Market 
Clearing? An Experimental Investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
Vol. 108, No. 2, pp. 437-459 
Fehr, E., Kirchler, E., Weichbold, A., & Gächter, S. (1998). When Social Norms 
Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets.  
Journal of Labor Economics. Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 324-351 
Fehrler, S., & Przepiorka, W. (2013). Charitable giving as a signal of 
trustworthiness: Disentangling the signaling benefits of altruistic acts. Evolution 
and Human Behavior, 34(2), 139-145. 
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic 
experiments. Experimental economics, 10(2), 171-178. 
Francois, P. (2003). Not‐for‐profit provision of public services. The Economic 
Journal, 113(486), C53-C61. 
Gagliarducci, S., & Nannicini, T. (2013). Do better paid politicians perform better? 
Disentangling incentives from selection. Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 11(2), 369-398. 
Gneezy, U., & List, J. A. (2006). Putting behavioral economics to work: Testing 
for gift exchange in labor markets using field experiments. Econometrica, 74(5), 
1365-1384. 
Greiner, B. (2015). Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments 
with ORSEE. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 1(1), 114-125. 
Hannan, R.L., Kagel, J.H., & Moser, D.V. (2002). Partial Gift Exchange in an 
Experimental Labor Market: Impact of Subject Population Differences, 
Productivity Differences, and Effort Requests on Behavior. Journal of Labor 
Economics. Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 923-951 
49 
 
Jones, D. A., Willness, C. R., & Madey, S. (2014). Why are job seekers attracted 
by corporate social performance? Experimental and field tests of three signal-
based mechanisms. Academy of Management Journal, 57(2), 383-404. 
Kessler, J. B. (2013). When will there be gift exchange? Addressing the lab-field 
debate with laboratory gift exchange experiments. CESifo Working Paper Series 
No. 4161. 
Koppel, H. & Regner, T. (2014). Corporate Social Responsibility in the work place: 
Experimental evidence from a gift-exchange game. Experimental Economics, 17: 
347. 
Kube, S., Maréchal, M.A., & Clemens, P. (2012). The Currency of Reciprocity: 
Gift Exchange in the Workplace. The American Economic Review. Vol 102, No. 
4, pp. 1644-1662(19). 
Lazear, E. P., Malmendier, U., & Weber, R. A. (2012). Sorting in experiments with 
application to social preferences. American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics, 4(1), 136-163. 
Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2007). What do laboratory experiments measuring social 
preferences reveal about the real world? The journal of economic perspectives, 
21(2), 153-174. 
Luo, X., & Bhattacharya, C. B. (2009). The debate over doing good: Corporate 
social performance, strategic marketing levers, and firm-idiosyncratic risk. 
Journal of Marketing, 73(6), 198-213. 
Maximiano, S., Sloof, R., & Sonnemans, J. (2007). Gift exchange in a multi‐worker 
firm. The Economic Journal, 117(522), 1025-1050. 
Montgomery, D. B. & Ramus, C.A. (2003). Corporate Social Responsibility 
Reputation Effects on MBA Job Choice. Stanford GSB Working Paper No. 1805 
Shapiro, C. & Stiglitz, J.E. (1984). Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker 
Discipline Device. The American Economic Review. Vol. 74, No. 3, pp. 433-444. 
Slonim, R., & Garbarino, E. (2008). Increases in trust and altruism from partner 
50 
 
selection: Experimental evidence. Experimental Economics, 11(2), 134-153. 
Strahilevitz, M., & Myers, J. G. (1998). Donations to charity as purchase incentives: 
How well they work may depend on what you are trying to sell. Journal of 
consumer research, 24(4), 434-446. 
Strahilevitz, M. A. (1999). The effects of product type and donation magnitude on 
willingness to pay more for a charity-linked brand. Journal of Consumer 
Psychology, 8(3), 215-241. 
Tonin, M. & Vlassopoulos, M. (2015). Corporate Philanthropy and Productivity: 
Evidence from an Online Real Effort Experiment. Management Science. Vol. 61 
No. 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Reference-Wage Effect and Motivation when Labour Demand 
Exceeds Supply:  
Evidence from a Gift Exchange Game with Sorting 
 
In this paper we examine gift exchange in an experimental labour market with an 
excess of labour demand. We implement a modified version of the gift exchange 
game where two employers and one worker are randomly grouped together in every 
round. In one condition we introduce a sorting mechanism to allow workers to 
choose their preferred employer in every round. Unsurprisingly, workers always 
choose the employer offering the higher wage but the presence of competition 
negatively affects the level of effort provided, supporting findings from Chapter 1 
of this thesis that workers already reciprocate a higher wage by choosing an 
employer over another. In the other condition of our experiment, where workers 
are randomly matched to one of the two employers without being able to choose, 
we find evidence of a reference-wage effect: when workers are randomly matched 
to the employer offering a higher wage, they provide higher levels of effort, ceteris 
paribus. In the last section of this chapter we compare results from the two 
experiments and show that in competition employers must offer significantly higher 
wages to attract and motivate workers, but that social incentives in the form of a 
portion of profits donated to charity, negatively affect employers’ earnings. Our 
findings help reconcile the evidence from lab and field experiments examining gift 
exchange and contribute to the literature on reference-dependent bias. 
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The experimental economics labour market literature provides compelling 
evidence that gift exchange can operate as a cost-effective contract enforcement 
device. Driven by a sense of reciprocity, workers work harder when paid a ‘fair 
wage’. This hypothesis was first proposed by Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and 
Yellen (1990), then supported empirically by a lab experiment designed by Fehr et 
al. (1993), later known as the gift-exchange game. In a typical gift exchange game 
lab experiment, players are assigned the role of employer or worker and are 
randomly and bilaterally matched in every round. Studies examining the gift 
exchange game, with their numerous variations, found supporting evidence for the 
hypothesis that workers deviate away from monetary payoff-maximising behaviour 
and, despite no contractual clause forcing them to do so, provide higher effort 
(incurring higher costs) when paid a higher wage17. 
An often overlooked but important element of this theory is that the notion of 
‘fair wage’ is strongly reference-dependent. In his seminal paper, Akerlof in fact 
used the definition of ‘fair wage’ and ‘reference wage’ almost interchangeably. In 
Akerlof’s theory, the reference point used by workers to evaluate if their wages are 
‘fair’ is what other similar workers earn. Based on Merton’s (1957) theory of social 
comparison, Akerlof stated: 
 
“Using reference-individual-reference-group theory, the fairness of this wage 
depends on how other persons in the worker's reference set are similarly treated 
[…] one argument of the perceived fairness of the wage will be the wages received 
by other similar workers. Such workers, of course, include workers who are 
employed; but, in addition, it includes workers in the reference set who are 
unemployed.” (Akerlof, 1982). 
 
 
17
 A review of the gift exchange game literature is provided in Chapter 1 and will not be covered again here. 
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The notion of equity and inter-group reference point has been tested in a recent 
gift-exchange game in the lab by Abeler et al. (2010). In this experiment the authors 
group two workers with one employer on every round18.  Each employer can set 
equal or different wages for the two workers randomly grouped with her. The 
authors find that under equal wages effort is lower, suggesting that some form of 
inequality might actually motivate workers to work harder. The authors argue that 
this behaviour can be explained by self-selection, and that different wages would 
allow more productive workers to sort themselves into the most appropriate wage 
for their preferred level of effort.  
The reference point however might not be only what other similar workers earn 
but also what other employers might offer. In Akerlof’s theory, firms are assumed 
to be homogenous, offering the same average wage; the ‘alternative wage’ is in fact 
considered to be the level of unemployment insurance, which other authors also 
argued would operate as a contract enforcement device (Shapiro and Sitligtz, 1984). 
A worker would then be expected to work harder when the employer offers a wage 
that is higher than the minimum wage for that job position, but also for fear of 
losing her job. 
The role of employer competition, and in particular when there is excess labor 
demand, has been overlooked by both the experimental and non-experimental 
labour economics literature, which have been mostly focused on understanding 
how workers’ characteristics affect hiring rates, wages and productivity, such as 
age, gender and ethnicity among others (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; 
Leibbrandt et al., 2014). Less attention has been paid to the role of the employers, 
for example the way employers are chosen by worker and whether this might 
influence productivity and performance. It is possible in fact that even employers 
 
18
 In the first gift exchange game, Fehr et al. (1993) also introduce an excess of labour supply, whilst many studies that 
followed used mostly a bilateral matching approach. 
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operating within the same industry or sector can be more or less successful than 
competitors in motivating workers to work harder. 
In this paper we show that the wage offer of a competitor employer influences 
the level of effort provided by the worker as a reference point. A worker might 
evaluate her opportunity-cost between an existing offer and that of another 
employer, and choose a level of effort accordingly, which one can expect to be at 
least partially affected by the competing offer19. This situation is common across 
all labour markets, but can be particularly visible in professions where labour 
supply is lower than demand and employers must compete more aggressively to 
attract and motivate workers. 
 
Reference Points – Reference points proved to affect behaviour in a number of 
ways (Kahneman et al. 1990). A key question explored by labour economics studies 
has been: “what determines a reference point for a worker?”. Sometimes the 
reference point can be one’s own level of income. DellaVigna et al. (2014) showed, 
for instance, how job seekers in Hungary increased job search activity after the 
introduction of a policy reducing their income support. The authors found that job 
seekers adapt their behaviour and lifestyle over time, hence changing their income 
reference point accordingly: those who did not find a job soon in fact returned to 
low levels of job search activity and simply reduced their consumption levels. This 
finding is in line with Camerer et al. (1997) that shows that cabdrivers in New York 
City set themselves a (loose) daily income target as a reference point and quit 
working once they reached that target20. In other settings where workers cannot 
 
19
 Consider a worker who receives an outside offer for a higher amount. If the current employer makes a counter-offer 
to retain the worker, the effect on the worker’s effort might depend on whether such counter-offer wage is below or above 
the outside offer. If below, the worker might perceive his firm’s offer as less than fair, and hence provide less of a gift 
exchange response than if the outside offer had not occurred. If the firm’s offer is above the outside offer, the worker might 
respond with a higher effort beyond the gift exchange response without the presence of the outside offer instead. 
20
 See Farber (2008) for a theoretical model and Farber (2005) for a revised analysis of the data on this behaviour 
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choose when to quit or reduce their workload, expectations about future earnings 
can influence effort in a similar manner. Abeler et al. (2011) found in a real-effort 
experiment that workers work longer when expectations about future rewards and 
earnings are high. Another reference point affecting workers’ behaviour can be the 
wage earned by a peer, such as another worker within the same company or 
industry. Using a gift exchange game grouping two workers and one employer, 
Gachter and Thoni (2010) showed that when workers are paid less than their peers 
they tend to work less than under equal wages. Similarly, Erkal et al. (2011) found 
that expectations about others’ behaviour (e.g. level of generosity) can enhance or 
deter individuals to act more or less reciprocally. Abeler et al. (2010) instead found 
that equal wages might deter workers to work harder because of heterogeneous 
levels of productivity that an employer should be able to reward differently. 
Similar to some of these studies using a three-player interaction in gift exchange 
games, in every round we group two employers and one worker. In the control 
condition the worker sees the wage offers of both employers randomly grouped 
with her and is randomly and bilaterally matched to one of the two employers, as 
in a standard game. In the treatment condition we introduce a sorting mechanism 
to allow workers to choose which of the two employers to work for and then select 
the level of work effort they want to provide21. By showing the workers two wage 
offers in every round we inevitably introduce a potential reference-wage. In our 
analysis we test whether this has an effect on workers’ behaviour. 
Similarly to the previous chapter of this thesis, we conjecture that when labour 
demand exceeds supply in a competitive environment, workers’ choice of an 
employer over a competitor may in itself already capture reciprocation of higher 
 
21
 Self-selection and sorting have often been overlooked by previous experiments, while disentangling this choice set 
might affect the magnitude of the observed level of reciprocity. Reflecting Akerlof’s (1982) theory: “A worker makes two 
choices. If offered employment (i.e., if the firm offers to "exchange gifts"), he must decide whether or not to accept the offer, 
and, if accepted, he must decide the size of the reciprocal gift.” 
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wage offers. If this is the case, then levels of effort may be diminished if the worker 
perceives (at least part of) reciprocity is provided through the employer selection. 
Further, economic models of involuntary unemployment suggest that fear of losing 
a job can operate as a worker discipline device when monitoring of worker’s 
performance is imperfect (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), so one should expect to see 
the opposite behaviour when the supply of labour exceeds the demand: workers 
should free ride more or provide zero (or close to zero) levels of effort because 
there is no penalty for them to do so, while employers will still have an incentive 
to offer higher wages to simply be chosen over a competitor. A natural consequence 
of this scenario would also be that employers’ earnings will be lower in 
competition, and converge to close to zero profits in the long run, since in order to 
be chosen employers will keep increasing wage offers up to the total amount of 
their initial capital22.  
In contrast with what standard economic models would predict, we find that in 
competition wages increase faster and reach significantly higher levels than in non-
competition, but they almost never reach levels of zero profits for the employer, 
with wage offers rarely exceeding 80% to 90% of an employer’s initial capital. This 
suggests that even in competition employers set a ‘maximum reservation wage’, in 
the same way a worker would do with a lowest acceptable wage, in order to remain 
profitable. We find that workers keep reciprocating also in competition, but less 
than in non-competition, supporting findings from Chapter 1 of this thesis. We also 
find evidence that the reference wage of a competing employer affects a worker’s 
effort: when workers cannot choose the employer to be partnered with but are 
instead randomly matched to the one offering a higher wage, they provide higher 
 
22
 A labour market with an excess of labour demand should also not have involuntary unemployment in the long run. 
Employers can keep increasing wage offers up to the point where it becomes more profitable to train and upskill unemployed 
workers than keep offering higher wages to existing workers. Further, in a competitive labour market with low supply of 
labour, wages should be expected to increase fast, and if workers do not reciprocate with high levels of effort, one would 
expect business to fail sooner. However, none of these consequences are actually observed in labour markets.  
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levels of effort, ceteris paribus, with this effect being more or less strong depending 
on workers’ characteristics. 
In the last section of this paper we compare the results of the first and second 
chapter of this thesis and show that the presence of social incentives (i.e. Corporate 
Social Responsibility in the form of a donation of a percentage of profits to charity) 
reduces the level of optimal wage offers that maximise employers’ earnings. 
Employers substitute wage offers for higher levels of social incentives, but this 
reduces workers’ effort and, in turn, employers’ earnings. 
 
I. Hypothesis 
In line with the analysis of the first Chapter of this thesis, we expect to observe 
employers reacting strategically to the presence of competition by providing higher 
wage offers: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1. H1: The presence of competition among employers 
significantly increases wage offers compared to a non-competition environment 
 
Worker’s reciprocal behaviour will then be observed in two ways: (i) the choice 
of the employer in the competition condition, and (ii) the chosen level of effort to 
provide to the paired employer. We study both behaviours accordingly: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2. H2: Higher wages will lead to increased likelihood of an 
employer being selected in competition 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3. H3: Workers are more likely to reciprocate and provide higher 
levels of effort as wages increase  
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As in chapter 1, we expect the selection of the employer to be perceived as an act 
of reciprocity, hence reducing the level of work effort that workers will choose to 
provide: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4. H4: The effects of wages on workers’ effort will be weaker in 
competition since workers will have already partially reciprocated employers by 
choosing them over a competitor  
 
Our additional hypothesis in this chapter is about the effect of a possible reference-
wage, namely the wage offer of the employer that is not randomly paired to the 
worker (when workers cannot select their preferred employer): 
 
HYPOTHESIS 5. H5: Workers will provide higher levels of effort when paired 
to the employer offering a higher wage than that of an unpaired competing 
employer 
 
In the next section we proceed with the explanation of our experimental design and 
results. 
II. Experiment 
A. Design and Procedures 
Our experiment is a modified version of the original gift-exchange game by Fehr 
et al. (1993), similar to the version used in the first chapter. In the first stage of the 
game, all employers in the room decide independently how much of their initial 
endowment E of 120 Experimental Currency Units (ECU) they want to allocate to 
make a wage offer w to the worker and how much they want to keep for themselves. 
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In the second stage of the game, the worker sees the wage offer chosen by two 
employers randomly grouped with her and chooses a level of work effort to provide. 
In one condition, workers are randomly matched to one of the two employers, as in 
the traditional set-up of the gift-exchange game and other similar lab experiments 
with bilateral matching. Consistent with the terminology used in the first study, we 
call this condition ‘non-competition’ (NC). In the other treatment, workers can 
choose which of the two employers they want to work for. The employer that is not 
randomly matched to or chosen by the worker earns nothing in that round. We call 
this condition ‘competition’ (C).  
At the beginning of each session a hard copy of the instructions is made available 
to each player and is read aloud by the experimenter, in an attempt to make all 
options and payoffs of employer, worker and charity common knowledge to all 
players23. Participants can also refer to the instructions and the payoffs formula 
throughout the session. A summary of the payoffs formula is shown in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1. Payoffs of players 
 
 
 
After answering a series of comprehension questions to make sure all participants 
understood the instructions correctly24, players are randomly allocated to be either 
employer or worker and stay in the allocated role for the duration of the experiment 
 
23
 Instructions were identical to the ones used in the first experiment presented in Chapter 1, simply removing the 
presence of CSR and charity. See Appendix of Chapter 1 for a copy of the instructions. 
24
 Participants answered on average 91% of questions correctly. A survey at the end of the experiment shows that 99% 
of participants found the instructions easy to understand and 98% thought the options available to them in the experiment 
were easy to understand. 
Payoff Employer πp =  (E – w) · e 
Payoff Worker πa = w – c(e) 
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– that is, 10 rounds. Exerting effort has a non-linear cost c(e) for workers, which is 
deducted from the wage offer of the randomly matched or chosen employer, 
according to Table 2. 
TABLE 2. Cost of effort 
Effort level e 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
Cost of effort c(e) 
ECU 
0 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
 
We implement a stranger design to avoid reputation effects: at the beginning of 
each of the ten periods, all players were reminded that they were going to be 
randomly regrouped with other two players. Participants in each session were also 
divided into matching groups. A matching group consisted of half of the employers 
and half of the workers in the room. For example, if a session had 18 players in 
total, participants were randomly split into two groups consisting of 6 employers 
and 3 workers each. Participants were not told which subjects belonged to which 
group and did not know what role was played by any other subject in the room. 
After the last round, subjects answered a short questionnaire.  
The experiment lasted in total approximately 60 minutes. Points earned in ECU 
were then converted to Australian dollars at an exchange rate of 0.05AUD/ECU 
and participants were paid in cash for all rounds depending on the outcome of their 
choices and an additional AUD$5 show-up fee. The experiment was conducted at 
the Behavioural Computer Lab of the University of Sydney, Australia, in August 
2016, for a total of six sessions with 108 participants. In both conditions, there were 
three sessions with n=18 participants. A summary of the demographic 
characteristics of participants across the two session types is provided in the 
Appendix. Participants were not statistically different between the two conditions 
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on any relevant demographic characteristic. The experiment was conducted using 
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 
2015). On average subjects earned AUD$ 18. 
 
B. Results 
In this section we present the results of the experiment and discuss possible 
explanations for the observed behaviour, both at the individual and group levels. 
We first analyze employers’ behaviour between the competition (C) and non-
competition (NC) treatments. Table 3 summarizes the key variables being 
discussed in this section. On average, wage offers of both employers and paired 
employer are higher in the competition condition than in non-competition. 
 
TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics of Wage Offer 
ECU Competition Non-competition 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Average wage offer (both employers) 180 84.83 16.22 57.06 17.73 
Wage offer paired employer 180 91.06 15.72 56.43 25.54 
Wage offer unpaired employer 180 78.59 19.45 57.69 23.28 
 
 
The earnings by group level shown in Table 4 suggest that workers earned 
significantly more in the competitive setting, whilst employers earned more in the 
non-competitive setting. 
 
 
62 
 
 
TABLE 4. Descriptive Statistics by Groups25 
ECU Competition Non-Competition 
Group 
Average 
Employers 
Earnings 
Average 
Workers 
Earnings 
Average 
Employers 
Earnings 
Average 
Workers 
Earnings 
1 8.14 81.67 16.92 48.20 
2 7.84 77.90 11.74 47.53 
3 7.77 83.60 10.89 48.33 
4 7.18 82.70 10.20 46.93 
5 6.60 86.37 9.89 60.43 
6 5.88 82.67 7.66 52.90 
Average 7.23 82.48 11.22 50.72 
 
 
Wage Settings – Figure 1 shows the average wage offer of both employers over 
ten rounds between the two conditions. On average, employers in both conditions 
offered wages that were above the minimum amount (i.e. 20 ECU). Wage offers 
started significantly higher in the competitive treatment, with average wage across 
the two employers in round 1 being 60.1 in the competition conditions, against an 
average of 50.6 in the non-competitive condition (p = 0.0473, Mann-Whitney test, 
with subject as unit of observation). The average wage offer increased in both 
conditions over the period of ten rounds, but substantially more in the competitive 
setting that in the non-competitive one. A t-test shows that the wage offers between 
 
25
 Groups are listed in order of employers’ earnings, from highest to lowest in competition and non-competition 
respectively 
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the two conditions are on average significantly different (t(358)=15.50; p < 0.0001, 
subjects as unit of observation). 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Average wage offer of both employers per period26 
 
 
As in other standard gift exchange games where one employer and one worker 
are paired bilaterally, we look at the specific relationship between the worker and 
the paired employer. Similar to the results presented in the first chapter, we refer to 
paired employer as the employer chosen by the worker in the competition treatment 
and the randomly matched employer in the non-competition treatment. 
Figure 2 plots the average wage offer of the paired employer only. We can see 
that the differences between the two conditions – competition and non-competition 
– are remarkable. In the competitive environment, employers start with an already 
 
26
 Error bars refer to standard error around the mean for each period. In competition, standard errors are small and get 
smaller over time, which the graph cannot display properly without changing scales between conditions.   
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higher average wage, which increases steadily over time, whilst it starts lower and 
remains mostly constant over time in the non-competitive environment. Overall, 
the average wage of the paired employer is significantly higher in the competition 
treatment than in the non-competition condition (Mann-Whitney test: p < 0.001, 
group as unit of observation). The different wage offer of paired employer between 
conditions is on average around 23 ECU in the first round and more than 50 ECU 
in the last round. 
 
FIGURE 2. Average wage offer of paired employer per period 
 
 
Wage Settings and Choice – We now examine whether workers’ ability to choose 
their employers drives the increase in wage offers. Over all sessions in the 
competitive setting, employers chose the same wage 5% of the time. When 
employers chose different wages, workers chose the employer offering the higher 
wage 93% of time. Only one worker ever chose a lower wage, and this worker did 
this four times. Figure 3 shows the average wage offer of the chosen and not chosen 
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employer in the competitive setting. It can be seen that, like in the first study, the 
employer offering the higher wage is consistently chosen over the employer 
offering a lower wage. 
 
FIGURE 3. Average wage offer of chosen and not chosen employer in the competition 
treatment 
Table 5 below reports estimates from a regressions measuring the probability of 
an employer i being chosen in the competition condition and whether she offered a 
wage that was higher than that of a competitor on that round (the independent 
variable), with the model specified as follows27: 
 
(1)                           Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1) =  𝛽1𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 +   𝑢𝑖 
 
 
27
 Including an independent dummy variable for when employers offered the same wage does not change the results 
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We cluster standard errors at the matching group level since subjects interacted 
throughout the experiment with the same subjects. 
 
TABLE 5. Determinants of Employer Choice in Competition 
 (1) (2) 
Constant -1.971*** 
(0.374) 
-10.90*** 
(0.969) 
Higher Wage Offer 3.976*** 
(0.856) 
11.97*** 
(0.344) 
Pseudo - R2 0.8398 0.9020 
Cluster SEs Yes Yes 
Round dummies No Yes 
Observations 171 171 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Probit. Robust standard errors clustered around matching 
groups in parenthesis. We removed 9 observations where wage offers of the two employers 
were identical, hence not explaining why workers chose an employer over another. 
 
 
Table 5 shows that the higher wage offer significantly increases the probability 
of an employer in being chosen in a competitive environment. As one would expect, 
the employer that offered the higher wage was virtually always the one being 
selected by the worker28. 
 
RESULT 1. Employer selection was driven by higher wages (H2). 
 
 
28
 By simple construction, when employers offered the same wage, they both had a 50% chance of being selected. 
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Wage Determination – We are now interested in understanding how wages get 
determined and change over time across conditions. To achieve this goal we first 
regress the average wage offer of both employers and wage offer of the paired and 
unpaired employer against a dummy for competition, round dummies and 
interaction terms of round and competition dummies, clustering standard errors at 
the group level as in the previous analysis. 
 
  TABLE 6. Effect of Competition on Wage Determination 
 
Average Wage Offer of Paired 
and Unpaired Employer 
Wage Offer 
Paired 
Employer 
Wage Offer 
Unpaired 
Employer 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
41.49** 
(2.651) 
50.64** 
(3.225) 
48.50* 
(5.309) 
52.78** 
(1.142) 
Competition 
27.77** 
(1.217) 
9.472 
(2.312) 
23.06 
(3.825) 
-4.111 
(0.799) 
Round 2 
6.903* 
(1.000) 
4.833 
(3.539) 
7.056 
(3.825) 
2.611 
(3.254) 
Round 3 
11.67* 
(1.578) 
5.944 
(2.740) 
5.444 
(1.827) 
6.444 
(3.654) 
Round 4 
15.74* 
(1.395) 
8.139** 
(0.542) 
8.278* 
(0.742) 
8** 
(0.343) 
Round 5 
15.40* 
(1.789) 
5.722 
(2.969) 
13.11 
(8.335) 
-1.667 
(2.398) 
Round 6 
18.76** 
(0.690) 
6.806** 
(0.200) 
8.889 
(6.965) 
4.722 
(6.565) 
Round 7 
20.62** 
(0.549) 
10.69* 
(1.399) 
9.556 
(9.248) 
11.83 
(6.451) 
Round 8 
21.26* 
(1.733) 
8.361 
(4.139) 
7.056 
(9.077) 
9.667* 
(0.799) 
Round 9 
23.31** 
(0.366) 
8.222 
(2.569) 
13.61 
(8.848) 
2.833 
(3.711) 
Round 10 
22.03** 
(1.521) 
5.500 
(1.199) 
6.333 
(3.768) 
4.667 
(1.370) 
Round 2*Competition  
4.139 
(5.052) 
-1.222 
(3.083) 
9.500 
(7.022) 
Round 3*Competition  11.44 6.778 16.11* 
68 
 
(2.283) (3.083) (1.484) 
Round 4*Competition  
15.19 
(3.910) 
10.39 
(5.652) 
20* 
(2.169) 
Round 5*Competition  
19.36* 
(2.312) 
4.500 
(6.907) 
34.22** 
(2.283) 
Round 6*Competition  
23.92** 
(1.798) 
15.28 
(6.108) 
32.56** 
(2.512) 
Round 7*Competition  
19.86* 
(1.684) 
15.33 
(10.28) 
24.39 
(6.907) 
Round 8*Competition  
25.81 
(4.767) 
20.50 
(9.648) 
31.11*** 
(0.114) 
Round 9*Competition  
30.17* 
(4.396) 
16.78 
(9.134) 
43.56*** 
(0.343) 
Round 10*Competition  
33.06** 
(0.685) 
27.39* 
(2.683) 
38.72* 
(4.053) 
R2 0.5065 0.561 0.481 0.378 
Cluster SEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 360 360 360 360 
OLS; Robust standard errors clustered around matching groups. We group all triads in one 
round to create one observation – that is, two employers and one worker randomly grouped 
together in one round, leading to n = 360. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
 
 
From Table 6 we can see that competition significantly increased average wage 
offer by a large effect from the first round, as explained by the dummy variable for 
competition. 
 
RESULT 2. The two conditions exhibit significant differences with respect to 
average wages: higher wages occurred in the competitive condition and they 
increased significantly over time, but not in the non-competitive condition (H1). 
 
It is possible that wages increase over time as employers see the wage offer of the 
unpaired employer and, in order to remain competitive, increase even more their 
offer in the next round. In competition, we would expect this effect to be stronger, 
since employers will offer higher wages to increase their likelihood of being 
chosen. We study this effect in a regression and report the results in Table 7 below. 
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TABLE 7. Wage Determination29 
 Wage Offer Employer 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 50.70* 
(4.218) 
56.18* 
(5.942) 
51.64* 
(5.807) 
57.99* 
(6.969) 
Competition 26.67*** 
(0.393) 
10.86* 
(1.046) 
14.15 
(3.520) 
27.94* 
(2.801) 
Wage offer Employer 2 on previous 
round 
0.124 
(0.0472) 
0.0347 
(0.0623) 
0.0126 
(0.0502) 
0.0395 
(0.0544) 
Wage offer Employer 2 on previous 
round * Competition 
 0.214** 
(0.00635) 
0.180 
(0.0397) 
0.0719 
(0.0861) 
Round 2   - - 
Round 3   2.293 
(2.233) 
-0.526 
(3.149) 
Round 4   6.115 
(3.509) 
-0.706 
(5.320) 
Round 5   3.131 
(3.601) 
-4.677 
(3.807) 
Round 6   6.281 
(1.571) 
-5.648** 
(0.203) 
Round 7   6.471 
(2.385) 
-1.478 
(4.319) 
Round 8   7.052 
(3.612) 
-3.242 
(7.282) 
Round 9   12.08** 
(0.672) 
0.126 
(5.752) 
Round 10   9.630 
(3.178) 
-2.820 
(1.891) 
Round 2*Competition    -22.69 
(6.240) 
Round 3*Competition    -16.17 
(4.568) 
Round 4*Competition    -7.908 
(9.725) 
Round 5*Competition    -5.969 
(7.295) 
Round 6*Competition     2.526 
(3.303) 
Round 7*Competition    -5.238 
(3.237) 
 
29
 Round 1 variables were treated as missing observations 
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Round 8*Competition    - 
Round 9*Competition    2.818 
(2.375) 
Round 10*Competition    4.017 
(9.843) 
Cluster SEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 324 324 324 324 
R2 0.3389 0.377 0.365 0.391 
(1) to (4) OLS; Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on matching group).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Omitted variables for rounds are due to perfect collinearity 
 
 
We see from Table 7 that the lagged wage offer of the unpaired employer has a 
positive effect on the average wage offer in competition (model (2), p = 0.019), but 
not in non-competition. In our experiment, all players see a screen before the next 
round commences that reminds them that they will be paired to different players 
than the ones they just interacted with. As such, employers know they need to 
attract and motivate a new worker on every round, so it seems plausible that they 
adjust their wage offers based on what they expect other employers to offer.  
 
Gift Exchange and Reciprocity – We now analyse the behaviour of the workers. 
Figure 4 shows the average effort over time across both conditions.  In both 
competition and non-competition conditions work effort is mostly positive, 99% of 
times in the competition condition and 80% of times in the non-competition 
condition30. 
 
30
 In our setting workers can choose a value of zero and still receive the offered wage, while in other gift exchange games 
sometimes a level of zero work effort is considered as a rejection and both the employer and worker would earn nothing in 
that round 
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FIGURE 4. Average work effort per period between competition and non-competition 
conditions 
 
To visualize the relationship between wage offer and work effort between the two 
conditions we plot the interactions with a line of fitted values (with a 95% 
confidence interval). Because we are interested in studying reciprocity in terms of 
how a level of work effort chosen by the worker affects outcomes for the employer, 
we do not consider the few observations when the paired employer offered a wage 
equal to 120 ECU, since no matter what the level of effort the worker would choose, 
this would lead to no earnings for the employer. This results in 3 and 2 observations 
being dropped in non-competition and competition respectively. 
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FIGURE 5. Work effort as a function of wage offer 
in competition condition 
FIGURE 6. Work effort as a function of wage offer in 
non-competition condition  
 
 
In line with previous studies and Chapter 1, we find evidence of gift-exchange in 
both competition and non-competition conditions. To investigate statistically the 
presence of gift exchange, we first look at the probability of providing positive 
effort as the wage offer of the paired employer increases. To achieve this goal, we 
create a dummy variable for gift exchange that gets a value of 1 when the level 
work effort chosen by the worker is higher than zero, and look at the number of 
times that there was a presence of gift exchange from the workers across both 
conditions. 
We see that in the non-competition condition, workers provided a positive level 
of effort around 80% of times (142 out of 177 times if we exclude the 3 observations 
when the wage offer of the paired employer was equal to 120 ECU). One worker 
provided a level of effort of zero across all rounds, regardless of the wage offer she 
or he was paired to. In competition, instead, workers provided positive levels of 
effort 99.4% of times ( a test of the relationship between wage offer and work effort 
in competition yields to the following result: Pearson’s χ2 = 39.05; p < 0.0001, with 
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group as unit of observation)31. To measure the impact of wage offer of the paired 
employer, therefore, we use only the data from the non-competition condition and 
report the results in Table 8 below. 
 
TABLE 8. Determinants of Gift Exchange (Non-competition condition only) 
 Gift Exchange (binary 0 or 1) 
 (1) (2) 
Constant -0.0185 
(0.312) 
0.100 
(0.263) 
Wage Offer of 
Paired Employer 
0.0169*** 
(0.00652) 
0.0185* 
(0.0109) 
Pseudo-R2 0.0809 0.0963 
Observations 177 167 
(1) and (2) Probit. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered 
around matching group. In model (2) we removed the 10 observations of the worker that provided 
always a level of effort equal to 0. 
 
From Table 8 we see that also in non-competition a high wage offer of the 
randomly paired employer significantly increases the probability of the worker to 
reciprocate providing positive levels of work effort, in line with previous studies. 
Our second measure of gift-exchange is the slope of the effort in response to 
higher wages. Table 9 reports the results of a regression where effort is now a 
continuous variable, going from 0 to 1. Across both conditions in the experiment, 
workers provided zero level of effort 37 times (10%). Of these ones, only one was 
in competition.  We use a Tobit model to censor observations where effort was 
equal to 0 or 1. 
 
31
 Testing the probability of positive reciprocity in competition via a Probit regression would therefore drop all variables 
since they predict success perfectly. 
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TABLE 9. Determinants of Gift Exchange 
 
Tobit, 35 left-censored and 65 right-censored obs.*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis (clustered around matching group). Observations where wage offer of paired 
employer is equal to 120 ECU are removed (i.e. 5 obs.) 
 
 
We can see from Table 9 that a higher wage offer increased the level of effort, 
but including a sorting mechanism has a negative effect on the level of effort 
provided by the worker. 
 
RESULT 3 – As wages increase, workers increase their effort, however 
competition decreases the level of work effort provided by the worker (H3 & H4). 
 
We now group wage offer of the paired employer by three groups: low (when 
wage offer is between 20 and 59 ECU); medium (60 to 99 ECU); and high (100 to 
120 ECU). Plotting the average work effort across all workers we can see that, on 
 Work effort (continuous 0 to 1) 
Paired Employer (1) (2) 
Constant -0.104 
(0.195) 
0.406*** 
(0.0536) 
Competition Dummy -0.401 
(0.260) 
-1.190*** 
(0.0100) 
Wage 0.00893*** 
(0.00280) 
0.00759*** 
(0.00108) 
Wage * Competition 0.00372 
(0.00308) 
0.00312*** 
(0.000576) 
Worker dummies No Yes 
Pseudo - R2 0.1767 0.9416 
Observations 355 355 
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average, in both conditions a low wage is met with a very low work effort (Figure 
12). In the competitive environment this relationship is almost linear. 
 
 
FIGURE 7. Average work quantity as a function of low, medium and high wage 
offer of paired employer in both conditions 
 
 
Reference Points – In the introduction of this paper we discussed the relevant 
literature on reference points and how different reference points (e.g. one’s own 
future income or other workers’ earnings) can influence behaviour. In our 
experiment we are interested to study whether knowing what the wage offer of 
another employer would affect worker’s motivation. Specifically, we look closely 
at the data from our non-competition condition (NC), where the worker is first 
randomly grouped to two employers and then randomly matched to one of the two 
employers (i.e. cannot choose the employer). We compute the wage difference by 
subtracting the wage offer of the unpaired employer from the wage offer of the 
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paired employer. A negative value means the unpaired employer offered a higher 
wage than the paired employer32.  
We can observe substantial differences across conditions by plotting the 
distribution of the difference between wage offers of paired and unpaired employer 
on a histogram. In competition the average wage differences are more concentrated 
around small values, whilst in non-competition these differences are more spread 
across all values, including larger negative and positive differences.  
 
FIGURE 8: Difference between wage offer of paired and unpaired employer 
 
 
32
 Recall that in our experiment, employers offered the same wage 9 times (5%) in competition and 14 times (about 8%) 
in non-competition. 
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To investigate whether the notion of a ‘fair wage’ is reference-dependent, we first 
look at the relationship between wage difference and workers’ effort on a 
scatterplot with a linear prediction line and a 95% confidence interval. From Figure 
9 we can see that there is a positive relationship between the wage difference and 
worker’s effort: the larger the difference with a competitor, the higher the amount 
of effort the worker will reciprocate to the employer, with this effect being stronger 
in competition.  
FIGURE 9. Work effort as a function of wage difference between paired and unpaired 
employer between conditions 
 
However, it is possible that this behaviour is explained by the fact that the worker 
is being paired to a low wage offer in absolute terms, rather than in relative terms. 
To disentangle this effect, we examine the data from the non-competition condition 
only and create a dummy for when the worker is paired to the employer offering a 
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higher wage. We estimate this model using Tobit, censoring observations when 
work effort has values equal to 0 and 1.  
 
TABLE 10. Competitor Reference Wage Effect on Effort 
(1) and (2) Tobit, 35 left-censored and 26 right-censored obs. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered around 
matching groups. Does not include 3 outliers where wage offer of paired employer was equal to 120 ECU. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Worker Dummies are dummy variables for each worker 
to account for different levels of reciprocity among subjects assigned to the role of worker. 
 
 
 
We can see from Table 10 that when the paired employer in the non-competition 
condition was offering a lower wage, this had a negative effect on effort, as 
expressed by the coefficient of wage difference (which takes negative values when 
the unpaired employer’s wage offer is higher than that of the paired employer), 
although this was not significant.  
 
The dummy variable indicating whether the worker was paired to the employer 
offering a higher wage, instead, has a positive coefficient. Column (3) of Table 10 
seems to suggest that there is some directional effect of being paired to a higher 
wage offer in the non-competition condition. It is possible that this random outcome 
sparks different reactions across different workers, with some being indifferent 
 Work effort (continuous 0 to 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.141 
(0.174) 
0.357*** 
(0.0265) 
-0.124 
(0.186) 
0.419*** 
(0.0412) 
Wage Offer of Paired Employer 0.00953*** 
(0.00243) 
0.00887*** 
(0.000313) 
0.00889*** 
(0.00241) 
0.00690*** 
(0.000297) 
Wage difference (Paired – Unpaired) -0.000103 
(0.000399) 
-0.000743 
(0.000465) 
  
Paired to higher offer dummy   0.0403 
(0.0271) 
0.0798** 
(0.0349) 
Worker Dummy No Yes No Yes 
Observations 177 177 177 177 
Pseudo-R2 0.1093 0.7448 0.1098 0.7494 
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about being paired to a lower offer and others, instead, suffering a disutility and 
providing lower levels of effort as a result.  
To take into account these worker-specific effects, we run again the Tobit models, 
this time including worker dummies, that is, dummy variables for each worker to 
account for different levels of reciprocity among subjects assigned to the role of 
worker. From column (4) we can see that being paired to a higher wage offer has a 
significant and positive effect on worker's effort (p = 0.023).  
Further, we conjecture that if workers react to the wage offer of the unpaired 
employer in the non-competition setting, they may react more to subjective losses 
than subjective gains33. To analyse whether this is the case, we run a piecewise 
linear regression to allow for a kink where the wage difference is zero – that is, the 
two employers offered the same wage.  
To do this, we use data for the non-competition setting only, and we create two 
dummy variables to estimate the predicted mean when the wage offer difference is 
just above and just below zero. We then create two variables for positive and 
negative wage differences to measure the slope of the effect.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33
 I thank a PhD thesis reviewer for this suggestion 
80 
 
TABLE 11. Competitor Reference Wage Effect on Effort Above and Below Zero 
 (1) (2) 
Positive Wage Difference dummy 0.409*** 0.698*** 
 (0.0706) (0.0830) 
Negative Wage Difference dummy 0.517*** 0.857*** 
 (0.0546) (0.0843) 
Positive Wage Difference 0.00368** 0.00130 
 (0.00185) (0.00127) 
Negative Wage Difference -0.000496 -2.62e-05 
 (0.00191) (0.00131) 
Worker dummy No Yes 
Observations 177 177 
R-squared 0.104 0.667 
(1) and (2) OLS; Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
From Table 11 we can see in both models (1) and (2), with and without worker 
dummies respectively, when the wage difference is positive this has a positive 
effect on effort, whilst a negative difference has a negative effect, as shown by the 
two wage difference variables. The dummies also show that the intercepts differ 
between negative and positive wage differences. To see this more clearly, we plot 
the relationship between work effort and wage offer difference with a kink in zero, 
when the wage offers are identical. 
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 FIGURE 10. Work effort as a function of wage difference between paired and 
unpaired employer in non-competition 
Figure 10 shows that the slope of effort is visibly steeper below zero than above 
zero. This confirms that subjects were more responsive to subjective losses than 
gains – that is, being paired to an employer who offered a lower wage was more 
‘painful’ to the worker and led to a stronger (negative) reaction, than being paired 
to the higher offer employer, which led to a weaker (positive) reaction. In other 
words, workers penalised more employers that offered a lower wage than rewarding 
employers that offered a higher wage. This finding is in line with other previous 
studies on loss aversion (Kahneman,  Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991). 
 
RESULT 4 – We observe a reference-wage effect, with workers providing higher 
levels of effort when they are randomly paired to an employer that offers a higher 
wage than that of a competitor in the same round (H4). 
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RESULT 5 – We observe a loss aversion effect, with workers reacting more 
negatively and providing lower levels of effort when they are paired to an employer 
offering a lower wage, than providing a higher level of effort when paired to an 
employer offering a higher wage. 
 
Employers’ Earnings across Experiments – We now combine the data from the 
experiments of chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis and analyse employers’ earnings. As 
expected, we see that the introduction of competition in both the presence or 
absence of social incentives (i.e. Corporate Social Responsibility in the form of 
donations of a percentage of profits to charity) negatively affects employers’ 
earnings as they have to give up higher levels of capital to offer more attractive 
wages. We see that across all conditions employers’ earnings reach a maximum 
amount after which they start decreasing, as captured by the negative sign of the 
squared term in Table 12.  
The presence of social incentives reduces the maximum wage offer that 
maximizes earnings for the employers in competition, but has a negative impact on 
profits. 
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TABLE 12. Earnings of Employers across conditions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Competition 
with Social 
Incentives 
Non-
Competition with 
Social Incentives 
Competition 
Non-
Competition 
Constant 
-11.88*** 
(4.579) 
-6.440* 
(3.328) 
-27.53*** 
(6.964) 
4.033 
(5.784) 
Wage Offer 
0.421*** 
(0.133) 
0.513*** 
(0.0936) 
0.621*** 
(0.173) 
0.363** 
(0.176) 
(Wage Offer)2 
-0.00253** 
(0.00103) 
-0.00371*** 
(0.000738) 
-0.00289*** 
(0.00109) 
-0.00326** 
(0.00145) 
Round Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 360 360 360 360 
R2 0.057 0.096 0.096 0.024 
Optimal Wage Offer 
83.34 
(10.510) 
69.05 
(3.729) 
107.45 
(12.678) 
55.614 
(6.603) 
Average Employer 
Earnings 
6.88 
(10.77) 
7.89 
(11.44) 
7.23 
(4.65) 
11.21 
(11.03) 
Average Worker 
Earnings 
68.83 
(16.37) 
47.15 
(20.37) 
82.48 
(13.94) 
50.722 
(24.11) 
Average Charity 
Earnings 
2.65 
(4.72) 
5.66 
(10.06) 
  
Standard errors in parentheses for the regressions and standard deviation for average values across conditions on last 
rows. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
This trend is represented visually also by the figure below, which maps earnings 
of paired employers as a function of wage offer. We see that the substitution effect 
is strong, as expected, but more so in competition, where wage offers concentrate 
in the higher average amounts (bottom right corner of the graphs). The presence of 
social incentives (CSR) limits this substitution effect, in both competition and non-
competition, reducing the optimal wage offer but also average earnings. 
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FIGURE 11. Employers’ earnings as a function of wage offer, with and without CSR, 
in competition (C) and non-competition (NC). 
 
FIGURE 12. Employers’ earnings Conditional Distribution Functions across all conditions 
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III. Discussions and Conclusions 
Empirical evidence shows that workers’ performance can differ significantly not 
only across industries and geographical areas but also within the same industry or 
employer. Numerous studies explained these variations by studying worker-
specific characteristics (e.g. education, race and gender). Less attention has been 
paid to the role played by employer-specific characteristics. In this study we 
showed how the presence of competition among employers increase wages but 
reduces effort provided by the worker, supporting results from chapter 1 that the 
selection of the employer over a potential competition is already perceived by the 
worker as a reciprocal act. This study also contributes to the literature on reference-
dependent behaviour. Other studies showed that worker’s effort can be affected by 
the presence of reference points such as one’s own expected level of income or 
earnings of other similar workers. In this experiment we show that the wage offer 
that another employer would offer can also affect worker’s reciprocal behaviour. 
We find that when workers are randomly paired to an employer offering a higher 
wage they reciprocate with higher levels of effort, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, we 
find that workers show an aversion to losses, penalising more employers who 
offered a wage lower than a competitor than rewarding employers who offered a 
wage higher than a competitor.  
A comparative analysis of earnings across conditions of all experimental sessions 
from chapters 1 and 2 show how employers’ earnings are negatively affected by the 
presence of social incentives due to a reduction in wage offers that decreases 
workers’ motivation. This is in contrast with previous studies that examined 
financial or social incentives separately, rather than within the same environment. 
Future laboratory experiments using gift-exchange game or real-effort tasks should 
consider introducing sorting mechanisms to account for self-selection and improve 
external validity. 
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Appendices 
A. Demographic Characteristics 
 Competition Non-competition 
Characteristic Mean % SD Mean % SD p-value 
Female 27 50% 0.50 27 50% 0.50 0.50 
Age 23 42% 3.13 23 43% 4.68 0.50 
Undergraduate 35 65% 0.48 37 69% 0.47 0.48 
Major Econ or Business 15 28% 0.45 24 44% 0.50 0.41 
At least one donation in past year 40 74% 0.44 42 78% 0.42 0.48 
Low Generosity 11 20% 0.41 13 24% 0.43 0.48 
Medium Generosity 18 33% 0.48 22 41% 0.50 0.46 
High Generosity 10 19% 0.39 7 13% 0.34 0.52 
High Disposable Income 5 9% 0.29 12 22% 0.42 0.43 
p-values are calculated with a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, with subjects as unit of observation. 
B. Descriptive Statistics by Groups 
ECU Competition Non-Competition 
Group 
Average 
Employers 
Earnings 
Average 
Workers 
Earnings 
Average 
Employers 
Earnings 
Average 
Workers 
Earnings 
1 7.18 82.70 9.89 60.43 
2 8.14 81.67 10.20 46.93 
3 6.60         86.37 7.66 52.90 
4 5.88 82.67 11.74 47.53 
5 7.77 83.60 10.89 48.33 
6 7.84 77.90 16.92 48.20 
Average 7.23 82.48 11.22 50.72 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Generous by Default: A Field Experiment on the Impact of 
Defaults on Charitable Giving 
 
Defaults proved to influence behaviour across a range of areas, from retirement 
savings to organ donations. When not well designed, defaults present the challenge 
of reducing an individual’s freedom and sense of control. In this paper we study 
the role of defaults in a previously unexplored setting where a preference for 
control might be stronger than in other contexts: charitable giving. We analyse 
results of a field experiment ran by an NGO hosting an online peer-to-peer 
microlending platform. In the experiment, lenders who had their loans fully repaid, 
but did not take any action for more than a year, received an email inviting them to 
use their money by a certain date in any way they preferred – withdraw, lend, 
donate or leave idle. In two treatment groups, lenders were told that if they did not 
take any action by the given date, their money was automatically going to be 
donated to the organisation (default donation) or re-lent to a group of borrowers 
on their behalf (default loan). We find that defaults are effective at increasing both 
the proportion of individuals giving to charity and the amount of giving, compared 
to a simple ask. The default loan treatment was more effective than the default 
donation, suggesting that to influence behaviour without risk of backfiring, defaults 
should be designed to consider individuals’ past behaviour and self-selection. 
 
 
 
90 
 
Donations to charity can be a rewarding act for a donor. Individuals might donate 
a portion of their money or time to a charitable organisation for a number of reasons, 
such as to improve the wellbeing of others, to increase their own feeling of self-
fulfilment, or to send a signal to their peers about their altruistic nature. At the same 
time, choosing a deserving recipient can be a costly exercise: a well-informed donor 
would have to collect and review information on a number of charities before 
choosing a preferred way to give and the size of the donation34. One possible way 
to reduce these costs is to delegate the choice of the recipient to a better-informed 
agent who will make the donation on the donor’s behalf. However, this mechanism 
can also reduce the giver’s sense of control and satisfaction acquired from the act 
of giving.  
To explore this trade-off between donor’s engagement and delegated choice, we 
analyse results from a field experiment ran by an NGO that hosts a peer-to-peer 
online microlending platform. The available literature on peer-to-peer 
microlending suggests that users of these platforms show behavioural patterns and 
social preferences that are virtually identical to those of individuals who donate to 
charities via more traditional fundraising channels.35 As such, motivations and 
incentives to lend for pro-social purposes are similar to other charitable giving 
contexts. The NGO’s experiment allows us to test the impact of two different types 
of defaults. A sample of 360 lenders who had money left in their NGO account for 
more than a year from previous fully repaid loans was selected and randomly 
allocated to: (i) control, (ii) default donation, or (iii) default loan. Subjects in the 
 
34
 There are an increasing number of online platforms that help potential donors identify a suitable recipient, such as 
CharityNavigator.org, GiveWell.org and CharityWatch.org, to name a few. 
35
 A study by Galak et al (2011) using data from Kiva.org on a sample of almost 300,000 loans found that lenders favour 
individual borrowers over groups of borrowers and prefer borrowers who are socially proximate to themselves on gender, 
occupation and first name initial. This suggests that the type of donors who are attracted by platforms such as Kiva.org might 
be motivated by ‘warm glow’ feelings. Another study by Chen et al. (2014) found that lenders on Kiva.org who join a team 
– that is, a group of lenders who team up to raise more and larger loans - contribute 1.2 more loans per month than those who 
do not join a team. This too confirms the impact of social incentives, such as social norms, in increasing charitable 
contributions, like in other traditional settings. 
91 
 
control group were asked to make one of three possible choices with their idle 
money: make a loan, donate it to the NGO or cash it out (‘simple ask’ control 
group). If they did nothing, their money would remain idle. In the two default 
treatments subjects were notified that if they did not take any action by a certain 
date, all their idle money would automatically be either donated to the organisation 
(‘default donation’ treatment group), or re-lent to another group of borrowers 
(‘default loan’ treatment group). 
Results show that both default treatments increased the total number of givers 
and the amount given compared to the control condition. We observe that the 
default loan treatment had a significantly larger effect on increasing giving, 
suggesting that defaults that align with donors’ preferences and past behaviour have 
a greater effect and, perhaps, a lower risk of backfiring. This is the first paper to 
provide experimental evidence on the role of defaults to increase charitable giving.  
 
I. Relevant Literature and Hypotheses 
In the following section we review the literature on charitable giving and defaults, 
which has previously been unexplored in the same setting. We present a number of 
hypotheses that are related to previous studies focusing on what motivates people 
to give to charity and what behavioural biases can help explain the effectiveness of 
defaults. We discuss how insights from these two areas of research can overturn 
expectations on how defaults can influence charitable behaviour. 
In the hypotheses and the remainder of the paper we will use the general term 
‘charitable giving’ to define both donations and microloans to borrowers in 
developing countries, as the latter cannot be considered a financial product given 
the close to zero return on investment. In the following analysis of the experiment, 
the “amount of money” refers to the money from previous fully repaid loans that 
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have been left idle for at least one year by a selected number of lenders on the peer-
to-peer microlending platform. We also provide a brief overview of the possible 
reasons why some individuals might prefer loans to more standard donations. We 
also discuss why this choice can be considered a form of self-selection into one’s 
preferred mode of giving, influencing the effectiveness of defaults as a 
consequence. 
 
A. Why Do People Give to Charity? 
The growing field of behavioural economics research provides evidence that in a 
wide range of scenarios, people systematically deviate from the rational self-
interested utility-maximising agent described by standard economic theory. 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) provided a first summary of laboratory 
experiments showing that individuals do not always behave consistently with 
simple models of utility maximization (e.g. demonstrating preference reversals and 
violating transitivity). The view of standard economic theory is that in the charitable 
giving space, the homo economicus acts on a purely self-interested basis. Following 
this logic, individual contributions to charities should not be observed if donors do 
not receive any benefits from it. Despite this line of thought, individuals can benefit 
from donating in a number of ways, as it signals their wealth to others or delivers a 
feeling of ‘warm glow’ (Andreoni, 1989). The basic assumption behind the 
economic model of ‘warm glow giving’ proposed by Andreoni (1989; 1990) can 
be summarized as follows: if individuals behaved purely altruistically by 
contributing to a public good, the efficient level of provision of their contribution 
is achieved when the marginal rate of substitution between the public and private 
good equals the marginal cost (Bergstrom et al. 1986; Andreoni, 2006). This means 
that if another donor or the government provides the public good in its entirety, an 
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individual should not make any additional charitable contribution as it would 
decrease both the level of efficiency of the public good and her own utility by giving 
up consumption. Thus, individuals should be unconcerned about the difference 
between a charitable contribution made voluntarily (e.g. a monetary donation) or 
involuntarily (e.g. by being taxed by their government).  
However, the literature finds that large donations from either a donor or 
government grants do not fully crowd-out individual contributions to charity 
(Andreoni and Payne, 2003). This difference can be attributed to the fact that 
individuals might perceive their donations as another consumption good that 
maximizes their utility, or in other words, increases their feeling of ‘warm glow’. 
The basic foundations of the ‘warm glow giving’ model by Andreoni (1990) paved 
the way for a number of laboratory and field experiments studying donors’ 
behaviour and motives for giving. In the following section we see how the existing 
literature on motives for giving and the role of defaults can be linked, even though 
their interaction has not yet been extensively studied. 
 
B. The Effectiveness of Defaults on Giving 
The psychology and behavioural economics literature have identified a large 
number of biases affecting individual decision-making. The ‘status quo bias,’ 
perhaps one of the strongest biases, is the powerful tendency to remain in one’s 
current position rather than changing to an alternative option, even when an 
alternative option might be more beneficial. Due to this, it is important to 
understand how defaults are set and how individuals come to sort themselves into 
default options. Madrian and Shea (2001) and Thaler and Benartzi (2004) showed 
that if retirement saving choices are framed as opting out instead of opting in, both 
the participation and the savings rate increase. Similarly, Johnson and Goldstein 
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(2003) show that countries with opt-out organ donor defaults (i.e. presumed consent 
to be an organ donor unless they choose to opt out) have a significantly higher 
number of potential organ donors than countries with opt-in donor defaults. There 
are several different explanations for why defaults are effective. Below we discuss 
a selection of possible explanations for what makes defaults relevant to the 
charitable giving context. 
 
One explanation for the effectiveness of defaults is that opting out can require 
time and effort in the immediate term, which might deter some individuals from 
taking action, even if opting out has substantial benefits in the long run. This 
tendency to over-value immediate benefits and costs (e.g. time, money or even just 
cognitive stress) at the expense of long-term improvements is known as ‘present 
bias’ (see Altmann et al. 2015; Tu and Soman, 2014; Sunstein, 2013; and Thaler 
and Sunstein, 2003, among others). A potential donor may be deterred by 
immediate costs that are on top of the value of the donation itself. Slonim et al. 
(2016), for instance, show that a longer waiting time to donate blood has a 
significant negative impact on the probability of a donor to return. Similarly, in a 
field experiment, Chuan and Samak (2014) found that asking households to write a 
personalised card, as opposed to a pre-written card, to accompany their donation 
decreased the proportion of people giving. These results, while they might seem 
intuitive, are somewhat in contrast to the charitable giving literature, which instead 
suggests that some donors give to charity for personal satisfaction and ‘joy of 
giving’ (Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002). The waiting time to donate blood and the ability 
to personalise a message to accompany a donation, as shown in the studies cited 
above, could be perceived as part of one’s donation, hence increasing donor 
satisfaction. On the one hand, potential donors may be attracted to defaults as they 
can reduce (or remove entirely) any immediate additional costs from giving; 
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however, defaults can also displace the concomitant feeling of ‘warm glow’ 
associated with charitable giving.  
 
Other authors have argued that defaults might influence behaviour because they 
signal that a third party (who can make decisions on one’s behalf) is better informed 
about best outcomes (McKenzie et al., 2006; Tannenbaum, 2011). Sunstein (2012) 
defines this as an implicit endorsement: “if choice architects have explicitly chosen 
that rule, people may believe that they should not depart from it unless they have 
private information that would justify a change”. In charitable giving this signalling 
effect can be particularly strong, especially when a donor has already supported a 
charity in the past. When full information on the outcome of one’s donation is not 
clear or easily available, a certain degree of trust in the intermediary (i.e. the NGO) 
is required to attract donors36. In a lab experiment, Butera and Houser (2016) show 
that delegating the choice of a donation recipient to an algorithm that guarantees 
efficiency of giving does not reduce donations. Similarly, the right level of 
contribution can be ‘suggested’ via defaults as a signal of what is considered a 
sufficient amount, as in an anchoring effect fashion37. In a field study Goswami and 
Urminsky (2016) show that setting a suggested donation amount as a default in a 
charitable appeal increases both participation rates and the average amount donated. 
However, because it is reasonable to assume that a charity might want to reallocate 
the funds raised from donations to different programmes or projects depending on 
the needs of its beneficiaries, the implicit endorsement can backfire in charitable 
giving. When this happens, previously set defaults might become an obstacle as 
they set unrealistic expectations from donors on how their money will be spent.  
 
36
 See Coffman, 2017 for a study on the role of campaigns as intermediary to attract donations. 
37
 See Furnham and Boo, 2011 for a review on the anchoring effect. 
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Our first hypothesis reflects the possibly positive effects that defaults can have 
on influencing charitable behaviour, suggesting that defaults help reduce or remove 
immediate costs (i.e. overcoming present bias) and leverage on the implicit 
endorsement of the NGO setting the default: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1a. H1a: Default loans and default donations in our experiment 
both increase the proportion of individuals giving to charity compared to a simple 
ask 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1b. H1b: Default loans and default donations in our experiment 
increase the amount of charitable giving compared to a simple ask 
 
Our second hypothesis, instead, is a rejection of the first hypothesis and considers 
the opposite scenario. Considering the evidence offered by the literature on motives 
for giving, one can expect defaults to reduce giving if donors feel that the donation 
is entirely delegated and not increasing their satisfaction in giving or control over 
the allocation of the contribution: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2. H2: Default loans and default donations crowd-out giving due 
to loss of control or disutility from forgone sacrifice  
 
 Defaults can also influence behaviour by affecting how alternative options 
to the default (or simply opting-out) are evaluated, inducing a ‘reference-dependent 
bias’ (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This bias refers to the tendency of decision-
makers to evaluate outcomes as gains or losses relative to a reference point. 
Outcomes of a decision that are superior to the reference point are perceived as 
gains, and inferior outcomes as losses. It is reasonable to expect that the way 
individuals sort themselves (directly or indirectly) into a default option, will lead 
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them to perceive that default as a reference point and value alternatives as gains or 
losses (Dinner et al. 2011). The reference-dependent bias inevitably influences 
decisions via loss aversion – that is, the propensity of individuals to receive greater 
disutility from a loss than positive utility from a gain of the equivalent magnitude. 
Some studies also suggested that reference-dependent bias and loss aversion may 
affect the construction of preferences via retrieval of information from memory: 
individuals may use a pre-existing preference or a past decision retrieved from 
memory as a reference point, and evaluate alternatives accordingly (Dinner et al. 
2011; Carmon and Ariely, 2000; Nayakankuppam and Mishra, 2005). 
When giving to charity, reference points can influence behaviour if a person has 
an existing preference for giving via a specific channel, supporting a certain cause, 
or likes to always contribute the same amount of money or time. This can be seen 
in the often-adopted measure taken by charities of asking donors to commit to 
regular gifting via automatic bank transfers (e.g. equal monthly installments). If a 
regular donor uses previous gifts as a reference point, a charity changing the type 
of projects it supports could have a negative effect on the donor. In the experiment 
analysed in this paper, for instance, subjects who supported the NGO in the past via 
loans might perceive an alternative mode of giving, such as a donation, as less 
preferable.  
The opposite argument, however, could also hold. A donor could experience 
diminishing marginal utility from always giving in the same way, meaning that an 
NGO offering an alternative mode of giving might seem more attractive. The 
influence of reference points, such as past behaviour, upon the effectiveness of 
defaults remains unclear and is worth exploring. To better understand this effect, 
we examine two different types of defaults in this experiment. In one treatment, the 
default results in money being lent to a group of borrowers, hence reflecting past 
behaviour of the decision-maker and taking into account a possible sorting 
mechanism that attracted the subject to the lending platform in the first place. In 
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the other treatment, the default results in money being donated to the organisation, 
as in a more standard charitable giving fashion, which is inconsistent with the past 
revealed preference of the subject of making a loan. 
 
One would expect that individuals who choose to join a peer-to-peer micro-
lending platform might have be attracted by features of these environments that are 
different to more traditional charities. One of these may be the possibility to 
monitor the impact of one’s contribution via loan repayments, increasing one’s 
sense of control over the outcome of a monetary contribution. It has been shown 
that individuals who have an external locus of control might have a weaker 
perception of their ability to bring change through their own behaviour and actions 
(Rotter, 1975). For instance, people with external locus of control will feel that their 
environmentally friendly actions might not make much of a difference because 
other agents (e.g. factories) make a bigger footprint on climate (Kollmuss and 
Agyeman, 2002). Similarly, these lending platforms might be attractive because 
they give the sense that one’s contribution goes ‘straight’ to the beneficiary, 
overcoming donors’ aversion to cover the NGO’s administrative or fundraising 
costs (Gneezy et al. 2014).  
Another reason why some individuals might be attracted to microlending 
platforms is the direct one-to-one connection with the beneficiary, reducing social 
distance and making the act of giving more personal and ‘human’. Charness and 
Gneezy (2008) showed that when players know the family name of their 
counterparts in a dictator game, those playing dictators allocate a significantly 
larger portion of their endowment to the other players. This could be referred to as 
the ‘identifiable beneficiary effect’, similar to the identifiable victim effect, 
extensively studied in psychology (Jenni and Lowenstein, 1997). Chen and 
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Putterman (2015) find for instance that lenders on Kiva.org38 are more likely to 
lend to borrowers with whom they share gender and ethnic similarity, suggesting 
that ‘homophily’ and preferences of specific characteristics of borrowers are 
important. Yet another reason why a donor might prefer a microloan to a donation 
is because a microloan can give the feeling of ‘warm glow’ from giving multiple 
times over the duration of the loan repayment, as opposed to a one-off contribution. 
Future research can help explain why some individuals might prefer loans to 
donations. However in this paper we are interested in understanding how such 
choices can be interpreted as a strong signal of self-selection into this specific 
preferred method of giving, whatever the motivation that led individuals to join a 
microlending platform in the first place. Not accounting for this signal might lead 
defaults to backfire. In other fundraising settings a signal of past behaviour can 
come from the amount of a previous donation or the choice of the type of charity 
to support. In other contexts, someone’s past behaviour can be revealed by previous 
active choices or via various methods of elicitation, such as choosing a realistic 
target for retirement savings. Our next hypothesis can then be generalised as 
follows: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3. H3: Defaults are more effective when aligned to decision-
maker past behaviour (a loan in this case) and when the loss of control is lower 
 
 More recently, a number of studies suggested the importance of carefully 
designing defaults to align default-setter and decision-maker interests (Altman et 
al. 2015), and to reflect individual preferences (Sunstein, 2013). This paper 
 
38
 Kiva.org, a platform that connects lenders to small entrepreneurs in developing countries and more recently also in the 
United States, has been the first successful organization of this kind. Partnering with microfinance institutions on the ground, 
Kiva.org allows lenders to make loans to any preferred borrower from a minimum of USD$25. Since its creation, Kiva.org 
has exponentially increased in size and amount of funding being transferred to developing countries, leading other NGOs to 
follow a similar approach. 
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contributes to this growing body of literature, showing how past behaviour and self-
selection can reveal individual preferences and how defaults can be designed to 
better reflect this information. The setting of the experiment examined in this paper 
also provides a particularly attractive environment to understand the role of self-
selection and past behaviour to influence the effectiveness of defaults. If subjects 
in this experiment joined the NGO lending platform because of a preference for 
loans, they will be more averse to defaults not reflecting such preference (e.g. a 
default donation). In the next section we describe the experimental design more in 
detail and discuss the results.  
 
II. Experimental Design 
In this paper, we analyse data from an NGO that runs a peer-to-peer micro-
lending platform39. As in other similar platforms, lenders can choose to allocate any 
preferred amount of money to make loans to borrowers in developing countries, 
donate money to the organisation hosting the platform, or both. When a loan is fully 
repaid, a lender can choose to cash out the money, make another loan, and donate 
it to the organization or any combination of these options. If they don’t take any 
action, their money will remain idle on their online account for an undetermined 
period of time. The partner NGO wished to find innovative ways to address the 
issue of a growing amount of funds that were left idle in lenders’ accounts, in many 
cases for more than a year, after loans had been fully re-paid.  A sample of 360 
lenders was selected and stratified by amount of money left idle in the account, 
gender and number of days since last activity. All lenders received an email from 
the NGO inviting them to take any preferred action by a given date (see Appendix 
 
39
 The NGO prefers to remain anonymous. For further information, contact the main author of this paper. 
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for a copy of the email template)40. In order to make it easier to take any action, the 
email contained a link to the login webpage and explained how to retrieve username 
and password in case the lender forgot it41. The emails were personalised by adding 
the first name of the lender at the beginning of the email and were signed off by the 
Chief Operating Officer, who had been the same person in that role for a number 
of years, hence the name would have been familiar to all recipients from previous 
communications, such as newsletters.  
Lenders were then randomly allocated to one of the three groups: one control and 
two default treatments where only one sentence in the email differed. In the ‘default 
donation’ group, lenders were told that if they did not take any action by the end of 
the month, all the money left idle in their account was going to be donated to the 
organisation. In the ‘default loan’ group, lenders were told that if they did not take 
any action by the end of the month, all the money left idle in their account was 
going to be lent to a group of borrowers chosen by the organisation on their behalf. 
As in other similar settings, default options gave lenders the opportunity to opt-out 
and take any action they preferred before the defaults ‘kicked in’. 
The treatment sentence varied across groups as follows: 
 
i. Control: You may want to do this by the end of the month, so you don’t 
forget. 
 
ii. Default donation: We understand you’re busy, so if you don’t do 
anything by the end of this month, we will automatically donate any credit 
 
40
 In a field experiment, Damgaard and Gravert (2016) sent out emails soliciting donations for a large Danish charity, 
where one group of people received an email reminder in addition to the original message. This increased both the likelihood 
of giving and the total amount raised. Because all lenders across groups in our trial receive the same email, we partially 
control for the reminder effect alone. 
41
 Rasul and Huck (2010) show that small hassle factors can have important implications for charitable giving, so we 
wanted to ensure small friction costs, such as finding the login page, were removed. 
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you have left in your account to [name of NGO]. Your donation will be 
used to teach women the money management skills they need to help 
themselves and their families escape a life of poverty. 
 
iii. Default loan: We understand you’re busy, so if you don’t do anything by 
the end of this month, we will automatically lend any credit you have left 
in your account to a group of borrowers supported by [name of NGO]. 
Your loan will help women and their families escape a life of poverty. 
 
All emails were sent out at the same time on Tuesday 20 September 2016 at 
10:30am using an email monitor software. Another reminder email was sent out to 
on Wednesday 28 of September 2016 at 10:30am. The end of the month then 
referred to the last day of September 2016, giving 10 days to lenders to take any 
preferred action. 
III. Results 
A number of emails ‘bounced back’ by the system indicating the email address 
probably no longer existed or the lender wished to not receive any more 
communication from the organisation. The bounce rate was as follows: 
 
TABLE 1. Final sample 
 Number Bounced Percent Bounced  Final Sample 
Control 10 8.3% 110 
Default Donation 15 12.5% 105 
Default Loan 17 14.2% 103 
Total 42 11.7% 318 
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The email accounts that bounced back were removed from the final sample for 
the analysis, leading to a total of 318 lenders. Table 2 provides a summary of the 
key variables by group. 
 
 
TABLE 2. Summary Statistics per Group 
 % Female Idle funds Days Since Last Activity 
  Min; Max Mean Min; Max Mean 
Control 72% 25 ; 401 111.5 
(81.91) 
544 ; 1069 847.54 
(132.70) 
Default Donation 72% 25 ; 414 111.34 
(87.97) 
544 ; 1096 834.49 
(144.03) 
Default Loan 73% 25 ; 434 110.18 
(87.06) 
544 ; 1049 841.16 
(123.04) 
Standard deviation in parentheses 
 
 
None of the characteristics summarized in Table 2 were statistically significantly 
different across groups (see Appendix for balance checks). 
 
 
A. The Impact of Defaults on the Extrinsic Margin 
Table 3 and Figure 1 below report the number of lenders that resulted in one of 
the possible outcomes, whether this was the result of an active action or the default 
option being activated. There are four possible outcomes: Idle (money remains 
idle), Donation (money is donated to the NGO), Loan (money is loaned to a new 
borrower, and Withdrawal (money is cashed out and returned to the lender). In 
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Table 3 and Figure 1 we let the outcome equal 1 if any positive amount occurs for 
an outcome. Thus, since it is possible that more than one outcome can occur if the 
lender allocates a portion of their existing idle money to more than one of the four 
possible outcomes, the sum of outcomes on the extrinsic margin can be greater than 
1.  
 
TABLE 3. Percentage of subjects that resulted in positive outcomes (i.e. contributions 
were > $0) 
 Idle Donation Loan  Loan or 
Donation 
Withdrawal 
Control 90% 5% 20% 24% 0% 
Default Donation 13% 78% 24% 100% 0% 
Default Loan 7% 3% 96% 99% 1% 
Note: some people took more than one action, resulting in more than one outcome 
 
Only one lender decided to withdraw all of her money (AUD$ 421.00). Excluding 
this person from the graph, Figure 1 provides a visual summary of the impact of the 
three outcomes showing that both defaults were largely effective at achieving their 
intended outcomes.  
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FIGURE 1. Percentage of subjects that resulted in one of the possible outcomes; Note: 
Some lenders took more than one action42. 
 
To measure the impact of defaults on the probability of giving we estimate the 
following response probability model: 
(1)             Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1) = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 +
 𝛽3𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐼𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 
 
 In (1), the dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
outcome resulted in a loan or a donation of any positive amount and 0 if the money 
was left idle or withdrew. The term Default is also a binary variable taking the value 
of 1 if the individual was randomly assigned to one of the two default treatment 
(Donation or Loan), and equals zero otherwise. We then add the three control 
variables: Female (a binary taking the value of 1 if the individual is female) and the 
 
42
 The amount left idle in the two treatment groups is money left over from loans. If a lender had more money than what 
is required to make a preferred number of loan she or he would leave that money idle in the account. 
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continuous variables Days Since Last Activity equal to the number of days since 
last activity and Amount Idle for the amount left idle in the account when they were 
initially contacted for the NGO’s experiment. Table 4 reports the results of these 
regressions. 
 
TABLE 4. Marginal Probability to Give 
 (1) (2) 
Baseline (Control) Giving 24% 24% 
Default  0.759*** 
(0.041) 
0.773*** 
(0.042) 
Female  0.065 
(0.053) 
Days since last activity  -0.000284* 
(0.000149) 
Amount Idle  -0.000226 
(0.000181) 
Observations 318 318 
Pseudo R-squared 0.6399 0.7114 
    t-test Control = Default t(317) =  -5.77 
p<0.0001 
t(317) = -25.05 
p<0.0001 
(1), (2) Marginal Probit (dprobit) Model. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The coefficient of the default variable is large and statistically significant, 
suggesting that being in a default group marginally increased the probability of 
giving by more than 75 percentage points. Given that 24% of subjects gave a 
donation or loan in the control (non-default) condition, the 75 percentage point 
increase is the maximum possible, indicating the default options lead to at least 
some positive amount of giving by all subjects in these conditions. Table 3 also 
shows that, as expected, a negative and significant coefficient of days of inactivity 
indicating that the longer a lender has been inactive the less likely she or he is to 
give again (driven entirely by subjects in the control condition given every subject 
in the default condition gave). A Pearson’s χ2 test on each default treatment taken 
107 
 
separately reveal that both treatments individually have a statistically significant 
effect in increasing the probability of giving43. 
 
RESULT 1. Defaults significantly increase the proportion of individuals giving 
according to the outcome set by the default (H1a) 
 
Observing more closely the differences between the two default treatments, we 
see that in the default loan group 19 lenders (18%) opted out of the default. Of 
these, one withdrew the money and three chose to actively donate it to the 
organization (for an average amount of AUD$96), with the remaining 15 actively 
making a new loan. In the default donation group, 27 lenders opted out (26%), of 
which only two chose to donate directly to the organisation (not waiting for the 
default to kick in, for an average of AUD$99) and the other 25 making new loans. 
We see a larger proportion of lenders opting out of the default donation than default 
loan, but this difference is not statistically significant (t(206):1.2615; p = 0.104, 
subjects as unit of observation). The number of lenders in both default treatments 
that chose to actively donate to the organisation is almost identical (three in the 
default loan group and two in the default donation group).  
B. The Impact of Defaults on the Intrinsic Margin of the Total Amount Given 
We now analyze the monetary impact of the default treatments. We begin by 
examining the amount given overall, and then look at the intrinsic margin of the 
amount given among those who gave something (i.e., an amount greater than $0).   
Overall, we find that the total amount given across the two default treatments 
combined led to a total revenue of AUD$22,453 compared to AUD$2,993 in the 
 
43
 χ2 = 57.18 and χ2 = 51.61 for default donation and default loan respectively. 
108 
 
control group, and the average amount given per subject across the two default 
treatments was AUD$108 compared to just AUD$27 in the control group.  
To measure the impact of the default treatments, we estimate the following 
model: 
(1)                        𝑌𝑖  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 +
             𝛽3𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐼𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 
         
The independent variables remain unchanged from the previous model (1), but 
the dependent variable Yi is now the total amount of money given by each subject 
via both loans and donations. We then add a series of interaction terms to observe 
the differences in slopes with the continuous variables as follows: 
 
(3)            𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽4𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝐼𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽6(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ∗
𝐼𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖) + 𝛽7(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖) +
 𝛽8(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖) + 𝛽9(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖 ∗
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖) +  𝑢𝑖  
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Table 5. Total Amount Given44 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -88.96*** 
(26.35) 
-30.40 
(24.13) 
67.24* 
(39.81) 
Default donation 132.3*** 
(9.804) 
43.64*** 
(13.91) 
-83.88* 
(50.36) 
Default loan 129.2*** 
(9.847) 
58.24*** 
(13.98) 
-88.91 
(54.68) 
Female 13.45 
(8.318) 
12.48* 
(7.253) 
12.09* 
(7.213) 
Days since last activity -0.0337 
(0.0273) 
-0.0270 
(0.0238) 
-0.142*** 
(0.0452) 
Idle Amount 0.763*** 
(0.0426) 
0.313*** 
(0.0725) 
0.301*** 
(0.0726) 
Default donation * Idle Amount  0.676*** 
(0.0935) 
0.694*** 
(0.0935) 
Default loan * Idle Amount  0.518*** 
(0.0944) 
0.544*** 
(0.0947) 
Default donation * Days since last activity   0.151*** 
(0.0578) 
Default loan * Days since last activity   0.172*** 
(0.0624) 
Observations 318 318 318 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1134 0.1288 0.1319 
Log-likelihood -1338.703 -1315.4433 -1310.7775    
Default donation = Default Loan F(1,313)=0.14 
p = 07114 
F(1,311)=1.48 
p = 0.224 
F(1,309)=0.01 
p = 0.9197 
Default donation * Idle Amount = Default 
loan * Idle Amount 
 F(1,311)=3.47 
p = 0.063 
F(1,309)=3.12 
p = 0.0782 
Default donation * Days since last activity = 
Default loan * Days since last activity 
  F(1,309)=0.15 
p = 0.6965 
Tobit, 84 left-censored obs. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 Parameter estimates in Table 5 show that the two default treatments have 
a large and significant effect in increasing the total amount given, via both loans and 
donations. The effect of the two defaults is also represented by all the variables where 
 
44
 The same regression using OLS is provided in Appendix D. 
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the treatment dummies enter as interaction terms – namely, 𝛽6 to 𝛽9 – and are all 
positive and significant. From the coefficients of the interaction treatment dummies 
with number of days of inactivity and the results of the F-tests reported at the bottom 
of Table 5, we can see that inactivity had a similar effect between the treatment groups 
(both increasing the amount given by approximately 15% to 17%). The difference of 
coefficients between the interaction treatment dummies with amount left idle, instead, 
is larger and weakly significant. This suggests that the impact of defaults might be 
different between groups.  
To examine the distinct impacts of treatments on possible outcomes, we focus on the 
average amounts raised across groups. Figure 2 below shows that the treatments were 
effective in achieving their intended objectives, with higher average amount of money 
being lent in the default loan group compared to the other groups, and higher average 
amount being donated in the default donation group than in the other two groups. As a 
result of the trial, the amount of money left idle in lenders’ accounts was significantly 
lower in the default donation (M=$2.57, SD=10.45) than in the control group 
(M=$86.71, SD=85.19), t(213)=10.04, p<0.0001 and significantly lower in the default 
loan group (M=$1.15, SD=6.10) than in control, t(211)=10.16, p<0.0001 . 
 
111 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Average amount of money that resulted in one of the outcomes 
(one standard deviation error bars) 
 
 
RESULT 2. Defaults are more effective than a simple ask at increasing average 
amount contributed to charity (H1b). 
 
Observing these results, we can reject the crowding out hypothesis: 
 
RESULT 3. Defaults do not crowd out charitable giving (H2). 
 
To study the differences across groups we estimate the same model as in equations 
(2) and (3) but with dependent variable being either amount lent only or amount 
donated only. We also analyse the outcome differences between behaviour of all 
subjects and for only subjects who gave a positive amount (i.e, the intrinsic margin). 
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TABLE 6. Donated and Lent Amount – Overall and Intrinsic Margin Effects 
 Donated Amount Lent Amount 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Overall  
(All Subjects) 
Intrinsic Margin 
(Subjects who 
gave > 0) 
Overall  
(All Subjects) 
Intrinsic Margin 
(Subjects who 
gave > 0) 
Constant -173.3*** 
(58.51) 
-30.36 
(28.03) 
-126.7*** 
(48.47) 
-17.61 
(23.07) 
Default donation 227.5*** 
(24.42) 
54.13*** 
(15.70) 
15.59 
(17.71) 
-0.272 
(11.03) 
Default loan -31.06 
(30.43) 
51.60* 
(26.37) 
171.7*** 
(17.21) 
11.88 
(9.000) 
Female -11.62 
(18.24) 
-5.282 
(8.693) 
30.34** 
(15.20) 
-2.672 
(7.431) 
Days since last 
activity 
-0.0360 
(0.0590) 
-0.00868 
(0.0259) 
-0.0393 
(0.0499) 
0.0217 
(0.0241) 
Idle Amount 0.485*** 
(0.0882) 
0.871*** 
(0.0434) 
0.609*** 
(0.0747) 
0.899*** 
(0.0373) 
Observations 318 91 318 146 
R-squared  0.832  0.810 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1490  0.0856  
Log-likelihood -597.37166  -955.07239  
Default donation = 
Default loan 
F(1,313)=0.14 
p < 0.0001 
F(1,85)=0.01 
p = 0.9064 
F(1,313)=86.64 
p < 0.0001 
F(1,140)=2.08 
p = 0.1513 
(1) and (3) Tobit, 227 and 172 left-censored obs. respectively; (2) and (4) OLS. Standard errors in parentheses *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Columns (1) and (3) from Table 6 report the result for all lenders (n=318) and 
columns (2) and (4) report the result for only those lenders who gave45, via loans 
(n=146) or donations (n=91), a positive amount. We can see that being in the default 
donation group significantly increased the amount being donated, both overall and 
at the intrinsic margin, with default donation treatment being significantly more 
effective than default loan at increasing donations overall. Similarly, the default 
 
45
 It is noted that since the treatment has already been shown to affect behaviour on the extrinsic margin, using the subset 
of the data with positive amounts can introduce an endogeneity problem. 
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loan treatment significantly increased the amount lent by all subjects, but not at the 
intrinsic margin.  
We now examine the role played by past behaviour in influencing the 
effectiveness of defaults, as stated in our hypothesis (H3). To achieve this goal, we 
stack our dataset to observe giving via loans and donations for each individual in 
our sample. We create a number of interaction terms and estimate the following 
model: 
 
(4)          Pr (𝑌𝑖 = 1) =  𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ∗ (1 − 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) +
                  𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ∗
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 +
𝛽6 (𝐼𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 − 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐼𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) 𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖 
 
In model (4) the dependent variable is a dummy variable with a value of 1 when 
the subject gave any positive amount of money via loans and donations for each 
individual (i.e., two observations per subject). The independent binary term ‘loan 
dummy’ takes the value of 1 when the money is given via loans and 0 when given 
via donations. Conversely, the dummy ‘1-loan dummy’ takes a value of 1 when the 
money is given via donations. The first independent variables cover 3 of the 4 
possible outcomes from the introduction of defaults. The first term shows whether 
subjects who were randomly assigned to the default donation group gave any 
amount of money via donations - i.e. the default matched the expected outcome of 
the way the subject gave to charity (‘donation match’). The second term shows 
whether subjects who were randomly assigned to the default loan group, hence 
matching their past behaviour, actually gave any positive amount via loans (‘loan 
match). The third independent variable instead cover the cases where there was a 
possible mismatch between the default and the subjects’ preferences, namely 
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whether subjects placed into a default donation ended up giving any positive 
amount of money via loans (‘donation mismatch’). From a first look at the data we 
can see that in the opposite scenario of the latter variable, only 3 subjects that were 
randomly placed into the default loan group gave any positive amount via 
donations, for an average of AUD$96.   
In order to better understand the influence of amount of money left idle on default 
outcomes, in a second and third model we introduce the variable Idle Amount 
centred on its mean (i.e., Idle_ci = Idlei – mean Idle). We estimate the model using 
Probit and marginal Probit, clustering error terms on the subjects’ unique ID. 
 
TABLE 7. Preferences for Way of Giving – Probability of Giving 
 (1)         (2) (3) 
Constant -1.894*** 
(0.250) 
  
Donation Match: 
Default donation * (1 – loan dummy) 
2.669*** 
(0.285) 
0.731*** 
(0.0381) 
0.732*** 
(0.0383) 
Loan Match: 
Default loan * loan dummy 
3.658*** 
(0.460) 
0.819*** 
(0.0355) 
0.819*** 
(0.0355) 
Donation Mismatch: 
Default donation * loan dummy 
1.181*** 
(0.284) 
0.431*** 
(0.0866) 
0.427*** 
(0.0874) 
Idle_c Amount  -0.000197 
(0.000226) 
- 
Female   0.00666 
(0.0138) 
Days since last activity   0.000112 
(8.59e-05) 
Default donation * (1 – loan dummy) * 
Centred Ide Amount 
  -0.000625 
(0.000602) 
Default loan * loan dummy * Centred 
Idle Amount 
  0.000771 
(0.000591) 
Observations 416 416 416 
Pseudo-R2 0.5030 0.5035 0.5081 
Test difference in giving when default 
conditions matched (i.e., Default 
Donation * (1 –loan dummy) = Default 
Loan * loan dummy) 
χ2 = 13.93 
p = 0.0002 
χ2 = 14.25 
p = 0.0002 
χ2 = 13.70 
p = 0.0002 
Test difference in giving when default χ2 = 30.82 χ2 = 30.80 χ2 = 31.07 
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conditions mismatched (i.e., Default 
Donation * (1 - loan dummy) = Default 
donation * loan dummy) 
p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 
(1) Probit; (2) and (3) Marginal Probit. Robust standard errors, clustered around lender unique ID, in parentheses. Idle_c 
Amount omitted from model (3). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We can see from the parameters in columns (1) to (3) and the related results of 
the tests at the bottom of each column that when the outcome matched the intended 
objective of the default, the probability that a subject gave a positive amount was 
significantly higher compared to when there was a mismatch, as shown by the 
negative coefficient of the constant term and the F-test results. Further, comparing 
the marginal effects (via marginal probit) of matched donation versus matched loan 
from columns (2) and (3), we see that the probability of subjects to give a positive 
amount to charity was significantly higher via loans, with this result being robust 
to the introduction of control variables. This suggests that the default that was most 
effective at increasing the probability of subjects to give was the one that better 
reflected individuals’ past behaviour, namely lending the money to a group of 
borrowers instead of donating it to the organisation. 
 We now undertake a similar analysis, this time focusing on the effect of matched 
and mismatched defaults on the amount of money given to charity, via loans and 
donations46. 
 
TABLE 8. Preferences for Way of Giving – Amount Given 
 (1)         (2) (3) 
Constant 2.796 
(1.777) 
-1.673 
(6.846) 
-1.404 
(4.413) 
Donation Match: 
Default donation * (1 – loan 
dummy) 
79.55*** 
(8.748) 
79.06*** 
(7.833) 
79.19*** 
(6.459) 
Loan Match: 
Default loan * loan dummy 
100.3*** 
(8.827) 
100.3*** 
(8.859) 
100.8*** 
(5.339) 
 
46
 In Appendix E we report the results of the same model but considering only observations where the amount given is 
positive (i.e. dropping observations where the amount given was zero) and show that the results are qualitatively the same. 
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Donation Mismatch: 
Default donation * loan dummy 
24.82*** 
(6.742) 
24.34*** 
(7.502) 
24.69*** 
(6.216) 
Idle_c Amount  0.455*** 
(0.0397) 
0.00316 
(0.00980) 
Female  -2.282 
(2.437) 
-2.190 
(2.316) 
Days since last activity  0.00760 
(0.00644) 
0.00689 
(0.00583) 
Default donation * (1 – loan 
dummy) * Centred Ide Amount 
  0.680*** 
(0.140) 
Default loan * loan dummy * 
Centred Idle Amount 
  0.828*** 
(0.154) 
Default donation * loan dummy * 
Centred Ide Amount 
  0.297** 
(0.141) 
Observations 416 416 416 
R2 0.251 0.494 0.616 
Test difference in giving when 
default conditions matched (i.e., 
Default Donation * (1 – loan 
dummy) = Default Loan * loan 
dummy) 
F(1, 207)=3.02 
p = 0.0835 
F(1, 207)=6.26 
p = 0.0131 
F(1,207)=8.09 
p = 0.0049 
Test difference in giving when 
default conditions mismatched (i.e., 
Default Donation * (1 – loan 
dummy = Default donation * loan 
dummy 
F(1, 207)=18.92 
p < 0.0001 
F(1, 206)=18.79 
p < 0.0001 
F(1,206)=20.33 
p < 0.0001 
(1) to (4) OLS models. Robust standard errors, clustered around lender unique ID, in parentheses. Idle_c Amount 
omitted from model (3). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
From the results presented in Table 8 we can see that on average, the two 
variables "donation match and "loan match" raised larger amounts of money given 
to charity. When we look at the interaction terms in column (3) we can see that the 
variable "Default loan * loan dummy * Centred Idle Amount" has a larger 
coefficient, which means that the amount of money originally left idle is also a 
strong signal of what was the preference of subjects in the experiment, namely they 
liked more loans than donations. Hence, when a subject was placed in a default 
treatment that did not reflect her past behaviour, this led to a significant decrease in 
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the amount of money raised by the charity via defaults. Figure 3 below visually 
summarizes the outcomes of the defaults depending on whether they matched or 
mismatched with past behaviour, compared to the ‘simple ask control group’. 
 
FIGURE 3. Average amount given via loans and donation depending on whether the 
subject was randomly assigned to a default that matched past behaviour 
 
 
RESULT 4. We find evidence that past behaviour has a significant role in 
determining the success of defaults (H3). 
 
In this analysis we showed that being placed in a default with outcomes that 
reflected past behaviour increased both the probability of that default to be 
successful and the magnitude of this effect. In our case, placing a subject into a 
default loan increased the probability of that person to give and the average amount 
of money given. We also found that the amount of money originally lent can be 
interpreted as a signal of the subjects’ preferences for loans over donations. 
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V. Conclusions 
In this paper we provided experimental evidence of the impact of defaults in a 
previously unexplored setting: charitable giving. Consistent with the positive 
impact of defaults in other settings, such as retirement saving and organ donations, 
defaults can be effective at increasing both the proportion of givers and the amount 
given. We provide evidence then that even in an environment where individuals 
might prefer to retain a stronger control over outcomes, such as in charitable giving, 
defaults do not crowd-out the intended behaviour. However, we find compelling 
evidence that in order to maximize their effect, defaults must take into account 
individuals’ preferences, which can often be elicited by observing past behaviour 
and understanding why an individual chose or defaulted into a certain situation in 
the first place. In the case studied in this paper, subjects might have originally 
joined the peer-to-peer microlending platform because they were attracted by the 
opportunity to lend to borrowers in developing countries as opposed to the more 
traditional way of donating money to charity. Not considering self-selection and 
past behaviour can lead to lower than expected effects (or possibly even negative 
effects) from defaults. 
An important challenge faced by charities trying to innovate their fundraising 
strategies is how to retain donors over time. Some charities increasingly ask their 
donors to commit to giving more regularly, e.g. on a monthly basis, by agreeing to 
transfer money directly from their bank account. It is important that this type of 
strategies keep reflecting donors’ preferences and the way their money is used over 
time is consistent with the reason that attracted them to giving to that particular 
charity in the first place. If charities want to be able to change how they allocate 
resources across projects over time, they should be wary that using default 
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contributions as a fundraising strategy can create difficulties in informing regular 
donors that their money will be used in a different way than their originally agreed 
on. Not understanding this trade-off between relying on regular donors and having 
operational flexibility can lead to negative consequences, such as a higher level of 
drop-out of donors or a decreased amount of donations. 
Similarly, government agencies or organisations interested in implementing 
defaults in other policy settings should consider the important role played by self-
selection and understand how and why individuals got into a specific situation in 
the first place. Testing and evaluating different types of defaults can help improve 
effectiveness of defaults and avoid negative consequences. 
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Appendices 
A. Trial Email Template – Control Group 
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B. Cumulative Distribution Function across Groups 
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C. Balance Checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Control Default 
Donation 
Default 
Loan 
(1)=(2) (2)=(3) (1)=(3) 
Female 72% 72% 73% 0.9272 0.9443 0.8716 
Idle Amount 111.5 111.3 110.2 0.9892 0.9241 0.9096 
Days since last 
activity 
847.5 834.5 841.2 0.4901 0.7201 0.7168 
Values in columns (4), (5) and (6) report the p-values from two-tailed t-tests 
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D. Total Amount Given (OLS) 
(1) to (3) OLS models. Robust standard errors, clustered around lender unique ID, in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -50.03** 
(21.14) 
5.582 
(18.29) 
49.97* 
(28.68) 
Default donation 82.71*** 
(7.030) 
-3.658 
(9.717) 
-62.76 
(38.05) 
Default loan 79.46*** 
(7.061) 
10.35 
(9.758) 
-67.24 
(41.79) 
Female 9.367 
(6.540) 
8.328 
(5.463) 
8.029 
(5.447) 
Days since last activity -0.00806 
(0.0220) 
-0.00975 
(0.0183) 
-0.0605* 
(0.0312) 
Idle Amount 0.694*** 
(0.0345) 
0.214*** 
(0.0506) 
0.204*** 
(0.0507) 
Default donation * Idle Amount  0.775*** 
(0.0695) 
0.787*** 
(0.0696) 
Default loan * Idle Amount  0.621*** 
(0.0701) 
0.640*** 
(0.0706) 
Default donation * Days since last activity   0.0684 
(0.0428) 
Default loan * Days since last activity   0.0894* 
(0.0468) 
Observations 318 318 318 
R-squared 0.655 0.761 0.764 
Default donation = Default loan t(317): 0.1385  
p = 0.4450 
t(317): 0.1385  
p = 0.4450 
t(317): 0.1385  
p = 0.4450 
Default donation * Idle Amount = Default loan * Idle 
Amount:  
 t(317): 0.1680 
p = 0.433 
t(317): 0.1680 
p = 0.433 
Default donation * Days since last activity = Default 
loan * Days since last activity 
  t(317): 0.0801 
p = 0.468 
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E. Preferences for Way of Giving – Intrinsic Margin 
 
 (1)         (2) (3) 
Constant 96*** 
(26.66) 
110.5*** 
(0.447) 
95.87*** 
(27.74) 
Donation Match: 
Default donation * (1 – loan 
dummy) 
9.439 
(28.31) 
-0.759 
(1.031) 
14.33 
(26.76) 
Loan Match: 
Default loan * loan dummy 
11.26 
(27.95) 
-0.0397 
(0.956) 
15.07 
(26.77) 
Donation Mismatch: 
Default donation * loan dummy 
20 
(32.31) 
-14.47* 
(8.131) 
2.754 
(27.54) 
Idle_c Amount  0.985*** 
(0.0133) 
- 
Female   -1.301 
(2.482) 
Days since last activity   0.000688 
(0.00881) 
Default donation * (1 – loan 
dummy) * Centred Ide Amount 
  1.000*** 
(0.00262) 
Default loan * loan dummy * 
Centred Idle Amount 
  1.002*** 
(0.0103) 
Default donation * loan dummy * 
Centred Ide Amount 
  0.882*** 
(0.104) 
Observations 209 209 209 
R2 0.002 0.9625 0.960 
Test difference in giving when 
default conditions matched (i.e., 
Default Donation * (1 – loan 
dummy) = Default Loan * loan 
dummy) 
F(1, 206)=0.02 
p = 0.8861 
F(1, 206)=0.32 
p = 0.5734 
F(1,206)=0.29 
p = 0.5884 
Test difference in giving when 
default conditions mismatched (i.e., 
Default Donation * (1 – loan 
dummy = Default donation * loan 
dummy 
F(1, 206)=0.26 
p = 0.6111 
F(1, 206)=2.77 
p = 0.0977 
F(1,206)=2.85 
p = 0.0927 
Dependent variable is amount of money given via loans or donations, but considering only observations where this is 
positive – i.e. we dropped 207 observations where Amount given was equal to zero.  
(1) to (4) OLS models. Robust standard errors, clustered around lender unique ID, in parentheses. Idle_c Amount 
omitted from model (3). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Conclusions 
 This thesis shows how self-selection plays an important role in 
understanding how individuals behave and respond to incentives.  
In the first two chapters I used a modified version of a common laboratory 
experiment, the gift exchange game, to show that workers reciprocate higher wage 
offers from employers by selecting them over a competitor, hence reducing their 
level of work effort as a consequence. This result can help reconcile the mixed 
evidence between field and lab experiments examining gift exchange. I also show 
how workers are more attracted and responsive to higher wage offers, rather than 
alternative types of incentives, such as social incentive. Further, I demonstrate how 
the wage offer of a competitor employer can influence worker’s behaviour as a 
reference point. In the last chapter I show how self-selection also matters in the 
charitable giving context. I discuss this finding in relation to the design and 
implementation of defaults, and how they must reflect the decision-maker’s 
preferences and past behaviour in order to be effective. 
 
Behavioural economics – the growing field at the intersection of economics and 
psychology – has proven that individuals do not always behave in ways predicted 
by standard economic theory. We are influenced by biases that do not always allow 
us to make the best decisions for others and ourselves. Understanding human 
behaviour can improve the reliability of economic models and the effectiveness of 
public policies. This thesis contributed to this growing research field by showing 
that it is important to understand how and why individuals self-select and sort 
themselves into specific situations or contracts in order to design the right type of 
incentives and defaults. Behavioural scientists and policymakers can design more 
effective incentives and defaults by analysing self-selection and past behaviour. 
Lastly, this thesis also contributes to the growing field of experimental economics 
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literature. I show how results from laboratory experiments can be more easily 
generalised with the introduction of a sorting mechanism, and how the effectiveness 
of defaults can be tested using field experiments. 
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Additional Appendices 
A. Study Instructions for Experiments in Chapters 1 and 2 
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. 
You can keep the instructions with you during the whole experiment and you can 
refer to them at any time if needed. 
Please note that during the entire experiment it is not allowed to talk to the other 
participants. If you have any questions or concerns, please raise your hand and 
ask us your questions quietly so others cannot hear. We will answer your 
questions individually. Please do not ask your question(s) aloud. If we think the 
questions asked are relevant to the group, we will repeat them and answer them 
for everyone. It is very important that you follow these rules, since otherwise we 
have to stop the experiment.  
If you have not already done so, please turn off your mobile phones and any other 
electronic devices you have with you now and put everything under your desk. 
 
Your Privacy 
 
As specified in the Participant Information Statement and the Participant Consent 
Form, your identity and the identity of all other participants will remain 
anonymous. This means that your decisions will remain private information and 
no other participants will know the decisions you made during the experiment or 
how much you have earned. 
 
Procedure 
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The experiment will last approximately 60 minutes and will include the following 
steps: 
 
1. Read the instructions and the examples along in silence as I read them 
aloud 
2. Answer a list of comprehension questions to make sure everyone 
understands the instructions and how the experiment works 
3. Make decisions on your computer screen 
4. Answer a short questionnaire about yourself and your experience in the 
experiment 
5. Collect your final earnings in cash from the experimenter and leave 
 
How you can earn money during the experiment 
 
Your final earnings will be the sum of: 
1. Your show up fee ($5) 
2. Possible payments for correct answers to the comprehension questions 
3. Your earnings based on the decisions you made during the experiment 
Your earnings will depend on your decisions and the decisions of the other 
participants.  Your earnings will be calculated in ECU (Experimental Currency 
Units), where 1 ECU = 0.05 AUD$. At the end of the experiment your total ECU 
earnings will be converted into Australian dollars and we will pay you in cash. 
 
The decision tasks 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned to be in the 
role of an employer or the worker. You will stay in the allocated role for the 
whole experiment. It is very important that you familiarize yourself with both 
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roles because your payment will depend not only on your decisions but also on 
the decisions of participants in the other role. 
 
The experiment consists of 10 rounds. Each single round follows this procedure: 
In each round two employers and one worker are randomly grouped together to 
form a triad. You will be randomly regrouped with different participants in each 
round so that you will never interact with the same participants more than one 
round in a row. 
1. Each employer individually sets a wage and a percentage of his or her 
profits to donate to charity. 
2. The worker observes both employers’ decisions. 
3. The worker is randomly matched to one of the two employers.  
4. The worker chooses a level of work effort to provide to the randomly 
matched employer. 
5. All members of the triad are informed about each other’s decisions and 
relative earnings for that round. 
6. Continue to the next round and repeat the steps above. 
 
How you can earn money in each round 
 
Earnings as an employer:  
If you are assigned the role of the employer, in each round you will receive a 
starting capital of 120 ECU. You will be asked to make two decisions: 
1. Offer a wage to the worker, and  
2. Make a donation to charity 
Wage: You can offer the worker any wage you prefer between 20 and 120 ECUs. 
The wage you offer will be deducted from your initial capital. For example, if you 
offer a wage of 20 ECU, you will have 100 ECU left; if you offer a wage of 36 
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you will have 84 ECU left; if you offer a wage of 120 ECU, you will have no 
remaining ECU left. 
 
Donation: You can choose to donate any percentage of your profits from 0% to 
100% to charity. 
After all employers have chosen a wage and a percentage of profits to donate to 
charity, two employers and one worker are randomly grouped together.  
The worker can see the decisions of the two employers and will be randomly and 
automatically matched to one of the two employers.  If you are the employer, in 
every round there is an equal 50% chance that you will be matched to the worker. 
If you are the employer who is not randomly matched to the worker in a round, 
you will earn nothing in that round. 
If you are the employer who is randomly matched to the worker in a round, then 
your profits for that round will be equal to your remaining capital, (that is: 120 
ECU minus the wage you offered to the worker) multiplied by the level of work 
effort the worker chooses, as expressed by the following formula: 
 Profits of the employer = (120 ECU – offered wage) ∗ worker’s effort  
Your final earnings for the round will be your profits times the percent of your 
profits that you did not donate to the charity, as shown in the following formula: 
 Earnings of the employer = (100% – percentage of profits donated to 
charity) * Profit of the employer, or in other words: 
 Earnings of the employer = (100% – percentage of profits donated to 
charity) * (120 ECU – offered wage) ∗ worker’s effort 
Earnings as a worker: 
If you are assigned the role of the worker, in each round you will see the wage 
offers and donations chosen by two employers randomly grouped with you.  
A random process will then match one of the two employers to you.  The chance 
you will be matched to one of the two employers in one round will be 50%.  Thus, 
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no matter what choices each employer makes, you will be equally likely to be 
matched to either one of them. 
Your decision is to select what level of work effort you would like to provide for 
the employer randomly matched to you.  
You will choose the level of work effort on a scale from 0 to 1 in intervals of 0.1. 
Each level of work effort has a cost that will be deducted from the offered wage 
according to the following table: 
 
Effort level e 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
Cost of effort c(e) 0 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
If you are assigned the role of worker, when making your decisions you will be 
able to see the table above on your screen in each round. A value of 0 corresponds 
to no effort, 0.1 corresponds to very low effort, a value of 0.2 is a slightly higher 
effort level and so on, and a value of 1 represents the maximum level of work 
effort.  
The worker’s earnings are calculated according to the following formula: 
 Earnings of the worker = offered wage − cost of effort 
Referring back to the profits and earnings of the employer, note that: 
The higher the chosen work effort, the higher the profits for the employer. If the 
employer chooses to donate 0% to the charity, then a higher effort choice would 
not increase the donation to charity. If you choose a level of effort equal to zero in 
a round, then your employer and the charity will not earn anything in that round. 
 
Donation to charity 
 
The money raised during this experiment will be donated to the charity ‘Cure 
Brain Cancer Foundation’. ‘Cure Brain Cancer Foundation’ is the largest 
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dedicated funder of brain cancer research in Australia. Partnering with the 
research community, it is steering the national and global agenda for brain cancer 
research.  
Founded in 2001 by a renowned neurosurgeon, the mission of the Foundation is to 
increase the five-year survival rate of people affected by brain cancer to 50% by 
2023. 
The objectives of the Foundation are to: 
 Fund brain cancer research that offers patients accelerated access to 
promising new treatments 
 Raise awareness of brain cancer 
 Support the creation and implementation of a collaborative, international 
and multi-discipline brain cancer research community 
The earnings of the charity on each round are calculated according to the 
following formula: 
 Earnings of the charity = (percentage of employer’s profits donated to 
charity) * the profit of the employer, or in other words: 
 Earnings of the charity = (percentage of employer’s profits donated to 
charity) * (120 ECU – offered wage) ∗ worker’s effort 
The earnings of the charity are thus influenced by not only the percentage of the 
employer’s profits donated to charity, but also the wage offered by the employer 
and the level of work effort chosen by the worker.  
At the end of the experiment we will sum the amount of money donated to charity 
across all 10 rounds by all participants matched in each round, and we will donate 
the total amount on behalf of all participants to the ‘Cure Brain Cancer 
Foundation’ online via the Foundation’s website. 
If you would like to receive a copy of the donation receipt you can provide your 
email to the experimenters on a separate form at the end of the experiment before 
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leaving. We will never be able to match your email with your decisions in the 
experiment. Remember that your decisions in this experiment will remain 
anonymous and the charity will not know the amount contributed by each 
participant. 
We will now show you four examples to better explain how the experiment 
works. 
Example 1 
Every employer has an initial capital of 120 ECUs and can make a wage offer of 
any value between a minimum of 20 and a maximum of 120 ECUs. 
A random process groups two employers with one worker. 
Employer 1 offers a wage equal to 20 ECUs and chooses to donate 10% of profits 
to charity. 
Employer 2 offers a wage equal to 70 ECUs and chooses to donate 20% of profits 
to charity. 
The worker sees the two offers: 
 Employer 1: 20 ECU wage offer and 10% of profits donated to charity  
 Employer 2: 70 ECU wage offer and 20% of profits donated to charity. 
A random process matches the worker to Employer 1. 
The worker chooses a level of work effort equal to 0.1. 
As a result of these choices, the outcome in this round is: 
Earnings of Employer 1 = 9 ECU, based on the following calculation: 
(100% – % of profits going to charity) * (120 ECU – offered wage) ∗ worker’s 
effort. 
Since Employer 1 chose 10% of profits to go to charity and offered a wage of 20 
ECUs, and the worker provided effort of 0.1, we have: 
Earnings of Employer 1 = (100% – 10%) * (120 ECU – 20 ECU) ∗ 0.1 
 which is equal to: 90% * 100 ECU * 0.1 = 9 ECU  
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Earnings of Employer 2 = Employer 2 earns nothing in this round because the 
other employer was randomly matched to the worker. 
Earnings of the Worker = 20 ECU, based on the following calculation: 
offered wage − cost of effort = 20 - 0 = 20 ECU 
Earnings of the charity = 1 ECU, based on the following calculation: 
% of profits going to charity * (120 ECU – offered wage) ∗ worker’s effort  
Which is equal to: 10% * 100 * 0.1 = 1 ECU  
Example 2 
Every employer has an initial capital of 120 ECU and can make a wage offer of 
any value between a minimum of 20 and a maximum of 120 ECU. 
A random process groups two employers with one worker. 
Employer 1 offers a wage equal to 40 ECU and chooses to donate 40% of profits 
to charity. 
Employer 2 offers a wage equal to 50 ECU and chooses to donate 90% of profits 
to charity. 
The worker sees the two offers: 
 Employer 1: 40 ECU wage offer and 40% of profits donated to charity  
 Employer 2: 50 ECU wage offer and 90% of profits donated to charity. 
A random process matches the worker to Employer 2. 
The worker chooses a level of work effort equal to 0. 
As a result of these choices, the outcome in this round is: 
Earnings of Employer 1 = Employer 1 earns nothing in this round because the 
other employer was randomly matched to the worker. 
Earnings of Employer 2 = 0 ECU, based on the following calculation: 
(100% – % of profits going to charity) * (120 ECU – offered wage) ∗ worker’s 
effort = 10% * 70 * 0 = 0 ECU 
Earnings of the Worker = 50 ECU, based on the following calculation: 
offered wage − cost of effort = 50 - 0 = 50 ECU 
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Earnings of the charity = 0 ECU, based on the following calculation: 
% of profits going to charity * (120 ECU – offered wage) ∗ worker’s effort = 90% 
* 70 * 0 = 0 ECU 
Example 3 
Every employer has an initial capital of 120 ECU and can make a wage offer of 
any value between a minimum of 20 and a maximum of 120 ECU. 
A random process groups two employers with one worker. 
Employer 1 offers a wage equal to 80 ECU and chooses to donate 50% of profits 
to charity. 
Employer 2 offers a wage equal to 100 ECU and chooses to donate 30% of profits 
to charity. 
The worker sees the two offers: 
 Employer 1: 80 ECU wage offer and 50% of profits donated to charity  
 Employer 2: 100 ECU wage offer and 90% of profits donated to charity. 
A random process matches the worker to Employer 2. 
The worker chooses a level of work effort equal to 0.5. 
As a result of these choices, the outcome in this round is: 
Earnings of Employer 1 = Employer 1 earns nothing in this round because the 
other employer was randomly matched to the worker. 
Earnings of Employer 2 = 1 ECU, based on the following calculation: 
 (100% – % of profits going to charity) * (120 ECU – offered wage) ∗ worker’s 
effort = 10% * 20 * 0.5 = 1 ECU 
Earnings of the Worker = 94 ECU, based on the following calculation: 
offered wage − cost of effort = 100 - 6 = 94 ECU 
Earnings of the charity = 9 ECU, based on the following calculation: 
% of profits going to charity * (120 ECU – offered wage) ∗ worker’s effort = 90% 
* 20 * 0.5 = 9 ECU 
Example 4 
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Every employer has an initial capital of 120 ECU and can make a wage offer of 
any value between a minimum of 20 and a maximum of 120 ECU. 
A random process groups two employers with one worker. 
Employer 1 offers a wage equal to 100 ECU and chooses to donate 0% of profits 
to charity. 
Employer 2 offers a wage equal to 30 ECU and chooses to donate 10% of profits 
to charity. 
The worker sees the two offers: 
 Employer 1: 100 ECU wage offer and 0% of profits donated to charity  
 Employer 2: 30 ECU wage offer and 10% of profits donated to charity. 
A random process matches the worker to Employer 1. 
The worker chooses a level of work effort equal to 0.9. 
As a result of these choices, the outcome in this round is: 
Earnings of Employer 1 = 18 ECU, based on the following calculation: 
(100% – % of profits going to charity) * (120 ECU – offered wage) ∗ worker’s 
effort = 100% * 20 * 0.9 = 18 ECU 
Earnings of Employer 2 = Employer 2 earns nothing in this round because the 
other employer was randomly matched to the worker. 
Earnings of the Worker = 85 ECU, based on the following calculation: 
offered wage − cost of effort = 100 - 15 = 85 ECU 
Earnings of the charity = 0 ECU, based on the following calculation: 
% of profits going to charity * (120 ECU – offered wage) ∗ worker’s effort = 0% 
* 20 * 0.9 = 0 ECU 
 
Comprehension questions 
 
We will now ask you a series of comprehension questions to make sure all 
participants understood the instructions correctly. While answering these 
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questions, and during the entire experiment, you may review the instructions that 
we have just read. 
Once everyone has completed the questions, we will then read all the questions 
and answers aloud. At the end of the experiment, you will find out how many you 
got correct. 
At the end of the experiment we will randomly pick one participant who will be 
paid an additional AUD$1 for every question she/he answered correctly. The way 
we will randomly pick one participant is as follows: when you signed in at the 
entrance you were given a small piece of paper with your pc number on it; at the 
end of the experiment we will ask everyone to put their numbers in a box and we 
will randomly pick one participant without looking.  When we randomly pick a 
participant, each of you will have an equal chance of being chosen.  
If you have any questions or concerns please let the experimenters know by 
raising your hand now, before everyone starts answering the comprehension 
questions. We will answer your questions individually. Please do not ask your 
question(s) aloud.  
 
Please insert your computer number: _________ 
 
1. At the beginning of the experiment I will be randomly assigned the role of 
employer or worker and I will remain in that role for the whole duration of 
the experiment: [TRUE/FALSE] 
2. If I am the employer I can offer any wage I want that is between 20 and 
120 ECU: [TRUE/FALSE] 
3. If I am the employer, I can choose any percentage of profits from 0% to 
100% that I want to donate to charity: [TRUE/FALSE] 
4. If the worker chooses a level of work effort equal to zero, the employer, 
and the charity earn nothing on that round: [TRUE/FALSE] 
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5. In each round I will be randomly grouped with two different participants 
so that I do not interact with the same people more than once in a row: 
[TRUE/FALSE] 
6. If I am the worker, I will choose the percentage of the profits that the 
employer will donate to charity: [TRUE/FALSE] 
7. At the end of each round I will be able to see the outcome of that round, 
including my earnings, the earnings of the persons randomly grouped with 
me and the earnings donated to charity: [TRUE/FALSE] 
8. My decisions and the decisions of other participants will remain 
anonymous: that is, I will not be able to identify who in this room made 
what choices today, nor will any other participant in this room today learn 
what decisions I made. [TRUE/FALSE] 
9. At the end of the experiment I will be paid in cash and you will receive 
$0.05 times the total number of ECUs that you have earned over all ten 
rounds [TRUE/FALSE] 
10. The percentage of all employers’ profits going to charity in each round 
will be summed and donated to ‘Cure Brain Cancer Foundation’ at the end 
of the experiment: [TRUE/FALSE] 
11. The mission of ‘Cure Brain Cancer Foundation’ is to raise awareness 
about climate change: [TRUE/FALSE] 
 
For questions 12 – 15, consider the following situation and answer the following 
questions. 
In one round, consider the following scenario: 
Employer 1 offers a wage of 20 ECU and will donates 50% of profits to charity 
Employer 2 offers a wage of 100 ECU and will donate 10% of profits to charity.  
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If the worker is randomly matched to Employer 1 and chooses a level of effort of 
0.7 (which recall has a cost of 10 ECU), what would be the earnings of the worker 
and Employer 2? 
12 Earnings of the worker: ________ 
13 Earnings of Employer 2: ________ 
 
In one round, consider the following scenario: 
Employer 1 offers a wage of 20 ECU and will donates 10% of profits to charity 
Employer 2 offers a wage of 100 ECU and will donate 50% of profits to charity.  
If the worker is randomly matched to Employer 2 and chooses a level of effort of 
1 (which recall has a cost of 18 ECU), what would be the earnings of employer 2 
and the charity? 
14 Earnings of Employer 2: ________ 
15 Earnings of the charity: ________ 
 
Once you have answered all the comprehension questions, please click the OK 
button below to see the correct answers. Once everyone has submitted their 
answers, we will read the correct answers aloud.   
 
Correct answers (read aloud) 
 
1. The correct answer is TRUE.  At the beginning of the experiment you will 
be randomly assigned the role of employer or worker and you will remain 
in that role for the whole duration of the experiment (that is, 10 rounds). 
2. The correct answer is TRUE.  If you are the employer, you can offer any 
wage you want that is between 20 and 120 ECU. 
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3. The correct answer is TRUE.  If you are the employer, you can choose to 
donate any percentage of profits you want to charity. This money will be 
donated to the charity at the end of the experiment. 
4. The correct answer is TRUE.  If the worker chooses a level of effort equal 
to zero, the employer and the charity earn nothing on that round.  
5. The correct answer is TRUE.  In each round, you will make decisions on 
your computer screen with two randomly grouped participants. You will 
be randomly grouped with new participants in each round, so that you 
never interact with the same participants more than once in a row. Your 
identity, and the identity of all other participants, will remain anonymous. 
6. The correct answer is FALSE.  If you are the worker, you do not choose 
the percentage of the employers’ profits donated to charity. The employer 
chooses this percentage. 
7. The correct answer is TRUE.  At the end of each round you will be able to 
see the outcome of that round, including your earnings, the earnings of the 
other two persons randomly grouped with you and the earnings donated to 
charity. 
8. The correct answer is TRUE.  Your decisions and the decisions of other 
participants will remain anonymous. 
9. The correct answer is TRUE.  At the end of the experiment you will be 
paid in cash in Australian dollars the total sum of all payoffs of your 
decisions, and we will convert each ECU you have earned into $0.05. 
10. The correct answer is TRUE.  The percentage of all employers’ profits 
going to charity on each round will be summed and donated to ‘Cure 
Brain Cancer Foundation’ at the end of the experiment 
11. The correct answer is FALSE.  The mission of ‘Cure Brain Cancer 
Foundation’ is not that of raising awareness about climate change but to 
support brain cancer research 
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12. Earnings of the worker: 10 
13. Earnings of Employer 2: 0 
14. Earnings of Employer 2: 10 
15. Earnings of the charity: 10 
 
If you have any questions or concerns at this stage please raise your hand and we 
will come to your desk. 
If you do not have any question, you can click on the OK button to begin the 
experiment. 
 
D. Final Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for making your decisions.   
We have some questions about you and your experience in this experiment that 
should only take another two minutes to complete. 
1. The instructions were clear and easy to understand: 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
2. It was easy to understand my options in the different rounds: 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
3. I am: 
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 Male 
 Female 
 Prefer not to say 
4. Year you were born: [scroll-down menu] 
5. What is your level of study? 
 Undergraduate 
 Post-graduate 
 MPhil/PhD 
 MBA/MPA 
6. What is your major field of study? [Drop-down menu list] 
7. Have you heard of ‘Cure Brain Cancer Foundation’ before this study? 
 Yes 
 No 
8. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The 
‘Cure Brain Cancer Foundation’ does important work for humanitarian aid 
assistance” 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
9. Have you ever made a donation to ‘Cure Brain Cancer Foundation’ before 
today? 
 Yes 
 No 
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10. How many times have you made a donation to any charity in the past 12 
months? 
 Never 
 Once 
 Between two and three times 
 Between four and ten times 
 More than ten times 
11. How much money have you donated to charity in the past 12 months? 
 I didn’t donate to charity in the past 12 months 
 Less than $10 
 Between $10 and $50 
 More than $50 
12. On average, how much money do you spend per week, excluding food and 
housing?  
 Less than $40 
 $40-$60 
 $60-80 
 $80-100 
 $100-150 
 More than $150 
13. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “I felt I 
could trust the experimenters” 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
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B. z-Tree Screenshots 
Employer’s screen in Experiment of Chapter 1 
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Worker’s screen in Experiment of Chapter 1 (Competition condition – i.e. sorting and social incentives) 
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Worker’s screen in Experiment of Chapter 2 (Non-competition condition – i.e. reference-wage effect) 
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Every player’s screen between one round and the next (stranger design reminder) 
 
 
